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Article
DOES IT TAKE A VILLAGE? PRIVATIZATION, PATTLERNS OF
RESTRICTIVENESS AND THE DEMISE OF COMMUNITY
PAULA A. FRANZESE*
ABSTRACT: As presently structured, common interest communi-
ties-the promised land of connection and civility-are destined
to disappoint those seeking an authentic sense of community.
Finding meaningful solutions to this fundamental paradox is im-
portant, because community does matter and our diminishing
stocks of "social capital" impose considerable strain on social and
legal systems. Understanding more about social capital, norms of
generalized reciprocity and the dynamics of community building
sheds new light on common interest community deficiencies and
bolsters the resolve to discover creative ways to mend the broken
promises of this main staple of suburban and metropolitan devel-
opment. Relevant community paradigms help to recast the re-
form dialogue and accompanying legal discourse in terms that
facilitate cooperation, compromise and "self-interest rightly
understood."
I. INTRODUCTION
"ATE have entered the golden age of "privatization,"
1 the somewhat pe-
V¥jorative term used to describe the "shift of government functions
from the public to the private sector."2 The latter part of the twentieth
century witnessed the growth of private residential communities, referred
to collectively as common interest communities (CICs), 3 in record
* B.A., Barnard College, J.D., Columbia University School of Law. The
author is Professor of Law at Seton Hall University School of Law, and thanks
Professors Angela Carmella and William Garland for their valuable insights, and
Amy Keillor, Joseph Chang, Lucia DeTrizio and Jeremy Adest for their fine
research assistance.
1. See generally EvAN McKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND
THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994) (chronicling phenomenon
of privatization in context of common interest communities).
2. George L. Priest, Introduction: The Aims of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POE'Y
REv. 1, 5 (1988) (quoting Craig Becker's principal component of shifting public
functions to private sector).
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000) (defining
common interest community as "a real-estate development or neighborhood in
which individually owned lots or units are burdened by a servitude that imposes an
obligation that cannot be avoided by nonuse or withdrawal" to pay.dues to home-
(553)
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numbers. 4 Once considered a remote alternative or the domain of
the affluent, today condominiums,5  cooperatives, 6  planned,
walled and gated communities7 represent the main staple of suburban
owners' association empowered to provide services, oversee common areas and
enforce servitudes burdening property).
4. See Community Associations Institute, Facts About Community Associations
[hereinafter Community Associations Institute] ("There are 231,000 community
associations in the United States. In 1965, there were only 500. Approximately
50% of all new homes built in major metropolitan areas fall within community
associations."), at http://www.caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Oct. 29,
2001). The Community Associations Institute, a national amalgam of developers,
homeowners' association leaders, residents and lawyers, takes as its self-declared
aim the education and representation of America's residential homeowners' as-
sociations and service providers. See id. (explaining role of Community Associa-
tions Institute). It reports on its website that as of June, 2001, approximately 47
million Americans live in community associations. See id. (noting potentially sur-
prising facts); see also MCKENZIE, supra note 1, at 11 (estimating that homeowners
associations grew from 10,000 in 1972 to 150,000 in 1992, and that at least 32
million Americans were members); Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old
Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 81 (1998) ("Residential community associations...
have been greeted with resounding approval in new real estate developments.");
Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1183 (1999)
(describing common interest communities as "perhaps the most significant form
of social reorganization of late twentieth-century America"); Robert H. Nelson,
Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property
Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 827, 863 (1999) ("By some
estimates, neighborhood associations will house more than 50 million Americans,
or about 20% of the population by the year 2000.") (citation omitted); PatrickJ.
Rohan, Preparing Community Associations for the Twenty-First Century: Anticipating the
Legal Problems and Possible Solutions, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 3, 5-6 (1999) ("[T] he age
of community association living ... is upon us. The rental market in every urban
center is rapidly disappearing as high-rise buildings are torn down, devoted to
commercial uses, or converted into condominium or cooperative housing.");
Laura Castro Trognitz, "Yes, It's My Castle", A.B.A.J.,June 2000, at 30, 30 [hereinaf-
ter Trognitz, "Yes, It's My Castle"] (citing Community Associations Institute statistic
that "[a]t least 42 million U.S. residents are members of 205,000 condominium,
cooperative and homeowners' associations"); Laura Castro Trognitz, Co-Opted Liv-
ing, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1999, at 54, 55 (noting Community Associations Institute esti-
mate that as of 1998, there are 205,000 homeowners associations in United States).
5. See WAYNE S. HYATr, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRAC-
TICE: COMMUNITY AssOcATION LAW 14 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that condomini-
ums, a twentieth century phenomenon, are organized so that residents own their
respective units in fee simple and own common areas as tenants in common).
6. See 2A PATRICK H. RoHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW
AND PRACTICE §§ 9.01, 9.02 (2001) (explaining that cooperative vests title in corpo-
rate structure, with each resident owning stock in corporation).
7. See generally EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA:
GATED COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (discussing America's gated
communities and their residents); ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE
AND FALL OF SUBURBIA (1987) (tracing origin of particular suburban areas).
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and metropolitan residential development8 across diverse economic
strata.9
These proliferating forms of housing rely on a declaration of cove-
nants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) to privately control land use,
services and conduct. 10 Written by developers and in place from the start
of development construction, these servitudes are likened to covenants
that "run with the land."11 Essentially, they serve as a sort of privatized
zoning smorgasbord. Residents' consent to the restrictions is implied
upon purchase, because the declaration of CC&Rs is recorded from the
inception of the project. 12 Changing the rules is exceedingly difficult be-
cause amendments to the declaration of CC&Rs typically require a
supermajority vote (such as two-thirds). 13
In the CIC setting, covenants have been devised to regulate every-
thing from whether pets are limited' 4 or prohibited,1 5 to the permissibility
8. See James L. Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community
Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1138 (1998) ("In the largest United
States metropolitan areas, a majority of all new housing sold is now in common
interest communities."); Rebecca J. Schwartz, Comment, Public Gated Residential
Communities: The Rosemont, Illinois, Approach and Its Constitutional Implications, 29
URs. LAw. 123, 124-25 (1997) ("Long considered the domain of wealthy subdivi-
sions on each coast, demand for gated communities... has increased dramatically
since the early 1980s.").
9. SeeJohn B. Owens, Westec Story: Gated Communities and the Fourth Amendment,
34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1127, 1136-37 (1997) (describing why individuals from all
social strata are moving into their own "security zone communities").
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Or PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.7 (2000) (noting that
common interest community groups have implied power to adopt reasonable
rules); see also Rohan, supra note 4, at 4 ("Covenants now represent the backbone
of community association arrangements of all types and should be recognized to
be as necessary and beneficial as zoning or other measures passed by local govern-
ments."). The Restatement explicitly incorporates into its definition of the com-
mon interest community the premise that individual units in the given
development are burdened by servitudes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SER-
VI-UDES § 6.2 (defining common interest community).
11. Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, Private Communities or Public Govern-
ments: "The State Will Make the Call", 30 VA. U. L. REv. 509, 519 (1996).
12. See Brian L. Weakland, Condominium Associations: Living Under the Due Pro-
cess Shadow, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 297, 299 (1986) (discussing reason why pure contract
law analysis cannot be used in condominium setting). For a discussion of whether
or not it is fair and appropriate to impute consent in this setting, see infra notes
189-203 and accompanying text.
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.10 (2000) (setting
forth power to amend declaration); see also Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 11, at 518
(explaining that CC&Rs are "subject only to modification by a super-majority of all
members").
14. See Dulaney Towers Maint. Corp. v. O'Brey, 418 A.2d 1233, 1238 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1980) (holding rule restricting owners to one pet per unit reasonable
in order to avoid excessive odors, noise and soiling of common areas).
15. See Noble v. Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266, 270-71 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (up-
holding ban on pets in condominium).
2002] 555
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and style of one's screen and storm doors,16 to the ratio of grass, trees and
shrubs allowed on one's property.17 Restrictions are imposed to regulate
the mounting of basketball hoops, the retrieval of dog droppings, the post-
ing of for-sale signs, the trimming of bushes' 8 and the color of window
curtains.1 9 Servitudes exist mandating that any doghouse be made of the
same material as the master house (either wood or brick) and hidden
from view by a six-foot fence or prescribed greenery. 20 Rules exist to pro-
hibit wok-cooking, compel "poorly dressed guests" to ride in service eleva-
tors and ban those wearing "flip-flops" from sitting in common-area
chairs.2 1
Homeowners' or community associations (associations) are formed
and a governing board of directors (board) is elected 22 to privately over-
see and enforce the restrictions. 23 The typical declaration vests governing
bodies with broad authority to establish and impose penalties for infrac-
tions of the rules.24 These penalties can take the form of fines, harass-
16. See Korandovitch v. Vista Plantation Condo. Ass'n, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D714,
D714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding ban on posting supplemental unit
numbers on storm door); Sprunk v. Creekwood Condo. Unit Owners' Ass'n, 573
N.E.2d 197, 198-99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (upholding as reasonable denial of
owner's request to install screen door).
17. See David L. Kirp, Book Review, Pleasantville, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999,
§ 7, at 22 (describing life in Disney's "model town," Celebration, located in
Florida).
18. See Dennis R. Judd, The Rise of the New Walled Cities, in SPATIAL PRAcricEs
144, 144-45 (Helen Liggett & David C. Perry eds., 1995) (listing issues that have
initiated litigation).
19. See Kirp, supra note 17, at 22 (describing regulations imposed on residents
living in Celebration).
20. See Elizabeth Razzi, House Rules, KiPLINGER'S PERS. FIN., Sept. 2000, at 86,
87 (discussing rules imposed on residents of development in Dallas-Fort Worth
area).
21. See N.R. Kleinfeld & Tracie Rozhon, In Flat Market, Co-op Life Has Steep Ups
and Downs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al (describing interactions between co-op
residents and board members). See generally Todd Brower, Communities Within the
Community: Consent, Constitutionalism, and Other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential
Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 203, 204 (1992) (discussing restrictions
which "have pervaded all aspects of residents' lives, from the provision of services
and amenities to the control of behavior outside and inside the individual unit").
22. See RCA Characteristics and Issues, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY AsSOCIATIONS:
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 9, 15 (U.S. Advisory
Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989) (explaining that board of di-
rectors is elected by unit owners, whose "votes are based on property holding....
In homeowners' associations, each unit or lot usually has one vote, regardless of
the number of residents in the unit. In condominium associations, votes are often
apportioned on the basis of the size of the individual unit, with larger units receiv-
ing greater weight.").
23. See HYATT, supra note 5, at 20-21 (articulating differences between condo-
minium and homeowner associations); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVI-
TUDES § 6.2 (2000) (defining common interest community).
24. See Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 11, at 518 (discussing structure of private
communities).
556 [Vol. 47: p. 553
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ment, resort to self-help and other punitive measures. 25  Often,
associations have the extraordinary right to non-judicial foreclosure, enti-
tling them to privately repossess and resell a resident's home to collect
unpaid fines, dues and fees. 26 Associations are further empowered to tax
residents to finance lawsuits, leading to what some describe as a "vicious
cycle" of litigiousness.27 One commentator observed that "[w] hen associa-
tions know that their legal fees will be reimbursed, as is typical, they are
more prone to sue. This stems from the common belief that the slightest
deviation-a cracked flowerpot, an errant rosebush-will be the transgres-
sion that plunges a neat neighborhood into decay." 28
The most frequently invoked rationales for the imposition of cove-
nants and other restrictions are the protection of property values, the pres-
ervation of aesthetics and the promotion of orderly conduct.2 9 But there
is more to it-and even more at stake-than financial investment, visual
niceties and control. In theory, and at least in rhetoric, common interest
communities, with their comprehensive and commonly imposed re-
straints, are supposed to provide a "complete living package and the sim-
plicity and convenience" of private ownership. 30 They vow to confer a
sense of community and a sense of place, offering "residents common
emotional, psychological, social, and financial advantages. '31 They hold
out the promise of connection in an increasingly disconnected world.
Compelling portraits of Americans' changing behavior over the past
several decades describe the modern-day breakdown of social bonds and
25. For a discussion of conflicts that arise between the boards and homeown-
ers, see infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
26. See Matthew Benjamin, Hi, Neighbor, Want to Get Together? Let's Meet in
Court!, 129 U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 30, 2000, at 56, 57 (defining right to self-
help foreclosure as meaning that "the association doesn't need a hearing or a
judge to sell a resident's house to collect fines and legal fees. Associations can also
tax residents to finance lawsuits. Members must pay or face fines, lawsuits, or,
ultimately, foreclosure."). For examples of this practice in action, see infra notes
148-51 and accompanying text.
27. See id. at 56-58 (describing power possessed by associations).
28. Id. at 58.
29. See Community Associations Institute, supra note 4, at http://
www.caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2001) (noting develop-
ment of community associations). On its informational website, which is peppered
with lots of "interesting facts," the Community Associations Institute states that
"[c]ommunity associations help protect property values by insuring compliance
with rules and deed restrictions." Id.; see also McKENZIE, supra note 1, at 122 (con-
cluding that "narrow private purpose" of CICs is "protection of property values");
Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of Community Associa-
tions: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 589, 612
(1993) (noting that " [ t] he most common rationale in support of use restrictions is
that they enhance the value of property").
30. Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 11, at 513.
31. Id.
2002]
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the ill effects of our increasingly withering community ties.32 Noted theo-
rists and social observers poignantly chronicle our yearning to go back to a
time "when public-spiritedness really did carry more value and when com-
munities really did 'work."' 33 In a wide range of settings "[w]e tell poll-
sters that we wish we lived in a more civil, more trustworthy, more
collectively caring community."3 4 I believe that in many ways the concur-
rent proliferation of common interest communities reflects the same long-
ing. Ironically, as presently structured, CICs-the promised land of
connection and civility-are destined to disappoint.
The parade of justifications trotted out in support of CIC patterns of
restrictiveness would seek to belie this conclusion. In addition to tradi-
tional rationales linked to economics and aesthetics, restrictions on what
members are allowed to do or must refrain from doing are supposed to
provide the "comforts" of predictability and conformity, honor common
expectations and facilitate effective compliance and enforcement mecha-
nisms. 35 Covenants and other conditions give the developer "the power to
create a distinct lifestyle in a development, which the developer can use as
a powerful marketing tool." 36 Rules and "rule police" are supposed to
contribute to the collective's peace of mind, promote harmonious ex-
change and provide the antidote to the feelings of vulnerability and inse-
curity that presumably inspired the move to the common interest
community in the first place.3
7
These suppositions, however, yield to what we do know about the litig-
ious, often acrimonious, realities of common interest community living.
38
Moreover, the relevant literature, which is rich and varied and comes from
a host of disciplines, suggests that in actuality the predicates for successful
community building are apt to be stifled, if not obliterated, by the sort of
restrictiveness and attendant preoccupation with compliance that is inher-
32. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 288-89 (2000) (describing ebb of social connectedness
and its effects on education, economy, health, politics, crime and productivity).
33. Id. at 287.
34. Id. at 402.
35. See Marc A. Weiss & John W. Watts, Community Builders and Community As-
sociations: The Role of Real Estate Developers in Private Residential Governance, in RESI-
DENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL SYSTEM?, supra note 22, at 95, 95 (offering reasons why community builders
have created and supported community associations).
36. MCKENZIE, supra note 1, at 127-28.
37. See Timothy Egan, Many Seek Security in Private Communities, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 1995, at Al (discussing reasons why Americans are finding security in liv-
ing in private town-like residential communities); Robert B. Reich, Secession of the
Successful, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine) at 16 (describing some condo-
minium communities as entirely self-contained).
38. For a discussion of troubles in common interest communities, see infra
notes 131-61 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47: p. 553
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ent in the traditional CIC model. 39 As a result, the relevant inquiry of
resident relations is reduced to the adversarial "what is my neighbor do-
ing?" as opposed to the far more desirable "how is my neighbor doing?"
The organizational, structural and social foundations of the typical
common interest community do not promote trust, which is an important
anchor of community. 40 Distrust kindles dissension, disagreement and
misunderstanding, and is a potent impediment to problem solving. That
by various indicators the social fabric of many common interest communi-
ties is falling apart at the seams should come as no surprise.
41
Certainly, more meaningful and comprehensive empirical data is
needed to discern precisely "[w]hat type Es] of communities are taking
shape in our community associations[.]" 42 Apart from the limited surveys
and anecdotal accounts,4 3 we do not know the full extent to which com-
mon interest community dwellers' lives are appreciably enhanced or bur-
dened by association practices. 44 Reports of association overreaching,
excessive preoccupation with rule enforcement and mounting resident
disenchantment are at significant odds with the internal (and arguably
self-serving) surveys that have been conducted. For example, a survey by
the Community Associations Institute4 5 reports that 75% of association
members are satisfied.4 6
The effects that CIC restrictions and their patterns of enforcement
are having on property values and market forces remains to be critically
explored.47 In at least some communities, the preservation-and-enhance-
ment-of-property-values rationale for the imposition of aggressive use re-
strictions accedes to recent realtors' reports that today the absence of
homeowners' associations and attendant restrictions has become a selling
point.48 A twelve county survey of resale buyers in California found that
39. For a discussion of privatization and the unrealized determinants of com-
munity, see infra notes 162-242 and accompanying text.
40. For a discussion of trust in communities, see infra notes 189-203 and ac-
companying text.
41. For a discussion of increased tension in common interest communities,
see infra notes 131-57 and accompanying text.
42. Winokur, supra note 8, at 1175.
43. For examples of research indicating growing discontent with lack of com-
munity adhesiveness, see infra notes 131-57 and accompanying text.
44. See Winokur, supra note 8, at 1175 (addressing associations' financial is-
sues that influence society's sense of community).
45. See Community Associations Institute, supra note 4, at http://
www.caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2001) (noting that Com-
munity Associations Institute is national trade organization of homeowners'
associations).
46. See id. (quoting Ellen Hirsch de Haan, president of Community Associa-
tions Institute, who cites to 1999 internal survey).
47. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL
L. REiv. 956, 958 (1988) (noting that "[it] is not clear.., that the housing market
does account for the future effect of continuing burdens adequately").
48. For a discussion of one group's protection against associations and
boards, see infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
2002]
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84% of those who did buy into a common interest community did so only
by default. They were hoping to avoid the CIC, and found themselves in
one simply because of the scarcity of alternatives. 49
The premise of this Article is that the patterns of regimentation that
accompany CIC living promote cultures that do more to destroy commu-
nity than to build it. The increase in litigation, conflict and tension be-
tween associations, boards and residents over the far-reaching content,
application and enforcement of imposed CC&Rs 5° suggests that "common
interest community" has become a misnomer of sorts. Just what are the
"common interests" shared by residents? And most essentially, where is
the "community"?
Finding meaningful solutions to this fundamental paradox is impor-
tant, first because community does matter.5 1 Second, common interest
communities' diminishing stocks of social capital (i.e., the value created by
neighborly relations and networks of give and take) 52 impose considerable
strain on social and legal systems. 53 Third, there is hope and promise in
the CIC construct. Precisely because of their flaws as well as their poten-
tial, common interest communities have the capacity to be catalysts for a
renewed, revitalized sense of community and sense of place. Realizing this
goal would satisfy the need for housing and, at least in some part, the
search for social connectedness.
49. See Stephen E. Barton & CarolJ. Silverman, Shared Premises: Community and
Conflict in the Common Interest Development, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRI-
VATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 129, 137 (Stephen E. Barton & Carol
J. Silverman eds., 1994) (explaining that many homeowners who might have
known of common interest community restrictions would not have purchased
their home; they only purchased because "ordinary neighborhoods were too few");
see a/soJames L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimiz-
ing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 1, 58
("[A]s more and more residential properties are bound by servitude regimes....
the option to reject the model(s) of servitude regimes prevailing in a given area
become less realistic for substantial segments of the real estate market ....") (foot-
notes omitted).
50. See Winokur, supra note 49, at 63-64 (discussing increase in litigation be-
tween association boards and members); David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential As-
sociations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers,
105 YALE L.J. 761, 761 (1995) (noting that "[a]s the number of residential associa-
tions has increased, the consequent litigation has arisen largely in the context of
disputes between residential associations and their members over the content of
frequently intrusive rules and regulations"). For a discussion of litigious patterns
and escalating conflicts in the CIC setting, see infra notes 131-57 and accompany-
ing text.
51. For a discussion of the significance of the sense of community and the
consequences of its decline, see infra notes 57-84 and accompanying text.
52. For a detailed definition of social capital and the benefits of facilitating
connections between people, see infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of ineffective legislative solutions and remedial judicial
attempts to decrease social animosity in associations, see infra notes 131-61 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 47: p. 553
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Common interest communities have a significant role to play in the
difficult task of recreating social capital and reinventing civic engagement.
As community is restored, a strong social fabric and meaningful patterns
of routine exchange would come to provide effective alternatives to for-
malized controls and commands as the principal determinants of compati-
ble and responsible land use. Authentic communities are able to develop
and promote appropriate norms that are relevant, persuasive and thereby
sustainable without excessive reliance on legal codification, mandates or
punitive sanctions for noncompliance.
As existing deficiencies bring developers back to the drawing board,
now is the time for finding new formats and innovative prototypes rooted
in the resolve to actively cultivate the determinants of community. Under-
standing more about social capital, 54 which at its essence concerns the
private as well as public gains that are reaped by fostering connections
between people, is crucial to the reform process. The touchstones of so-
cial capital and the predicates to successful connection have been studied
and tracked by several disciplines in a variety of relevant settings.5 5 The
findings shed new light on common interest community flaws and bolster
the resolve to discover creative ways to mend the broken promises of this
dominant force in housing development.
Perhaps most essentially, these studied constructs have the potential
to beneficially inform the legal and political discourse that surrounds the
CIC reform effort. Existing lexicons need to be fortified with a working
vocabulary that allows reformers to recast the relevant dialogue in terms
that more sharply focus on understanding and supporting the dynamics of
social connections and connectedness. Recognition of the promise of
community and the determinants of its success places rightful emphasis on
the values of cooperation, compromise, shared understanding and trust. 56
The following sections of this Article support the conclusion that pre-
sent CIC planning patterns and modes of dispute resolution, with their
emphasis on formalized mandates and broad enforcement mechanisms,
create cultures of distrust. This unintended consequence impedes (if not
precludes) the development of authentic community. As a result, there
are few, if any, mechanisms in place to allow rigidity, suspicion and dissen-
sion to yield to cooperation, mutual aid, interdependence and respect.
Transaction costs escalate in a myriad of ways, perhaps most noticeably as
54. For a discussion of the benefits and drawback of social capital, see infra
notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of shared characteristics in communities explored as an
agenda 'for reform, see infra notes 163-242 and accompanying text.
56. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTs TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DIscOuRSE xi (1991) (discussing failure of American political discourse to take into
account meaningful social environments and systems, so that controversies are
framed in terms that impede "compromise, mutual understanding and the discov-
ery of common ground").
20021
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formal legal institutions are called upon to accomplish what once was left
(and is best left) to informal networks and social capital.
Covenants, conditions and restrictions do, however, have a role to
play in CIC planning. Within reason, resorting to servitudes can be useful
and efficient. How, then, might the worthier aims of privately-imposed
restrictions be advanced without overreaching, so that "community" is not
discarded in the name of "common interest community" planning? To
respond meaningfully, it is helpful first to explore why community matters
and then how and why present CIC models are faltering.
II. Wri- COMMUNITY MATTERS
A. The Decline of Connectedness and Its Consequences
The cohesive, close-knit community is part of the American dream,5 7
a coveted icon that builds social capital, 58 nurtures the soul and encour-
ages civic responsibility. 59 Yet, community has declined in our time, a
trend chronicled by scholars, pollsters and social observers alike.60 Sadly,
over the past two generations, "Americans have had a growing sense at
some visceral level of disintegrating social bonds. '6 1 The "ebbing of com-
57. See Todd W. Bressi, Planning the American Dream, in PETER KATZ, THE NEW
URBANISM: TOWARD AN ARCHITECTURE OF COMMUNITY XXV, XXXV (1994) (discussing
influence of new urbanism principles on American city and suburban develop-
ment of communities).
58. See Mark Baldassare & Claude S. Fischer, Suburban Life: Powerlessness and
Need for Affiliation, 10 URB. AFF. Q. 314, 315 (1975) (explaining that "social capital"
theory takes as its essential premise notion that social contacts and networks confer
private as well as public gains, and that well-connected community tends to be
more efficient). For a discussion of the desirability of social capital in communi-
ties to enhance social norms and relationships, see infra notes 95-108 and accom-
panying text.
59. See KATZ, supra note 57, at ix (noting community degradation as responsi-
ble for social alienation and rising crime rates); see also PUTNAM, supra note 32, at
21 ("Civic engagement and social capital entail mutual obligation and responsibil-
ity for action.").
60. See PUTNAM, supra note 32, at 30-47 (engaging in impressive and careful
review of trends in American social capital and civic engagement).
61. See id. at 287. See generally Mark Baldassare & Georgeanna Wilson, More
Trouble in Paradise: Urbanization and the Decline in Suburban Quality-of-Life Ratings, 30
URB. AFF. REv. 690, 691-92 (1995) (examining "whether suburban residents have
experienced a decline in their perceptions of the quality of their lives" and noting
that "the discrepancy between real conditions in today's suburban regions and the
ideals and expectations residents have about community life seems to predict de-
clining perceptions of the quality of life"). Many social theorists have chronicled
and decried the diminished sense of community in American life. See, e.g., RALPH
KEYES, WE THE LONELY PEOPLE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 9-10 (1973) (describing loss
of community and noting that today "a sense of community... rarely includes the
neighbors"); LARRY LYON, THE COMMUNITY IN URBAN SOCIETY 68-70 (1987) (exam-
ining James Coleman's "Gresham's Law of Conflict," which holds that those in
community who advocate conflict. prevail over those who advocate order); SEY-
MOUR B. SARASON, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF COMMUNITY: PROSPECTS FOR A
COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY 2 (1974) (criticizing present communities as providing
little kinship and lack of feeling needed among its members); H. Warner Dunham,
[Vol. 47: p. 553
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munity over the last several decades has been silent and deceptive. We
notice its effects in the strained interstices of our private lives and in the
degradation of our public life, but the most serious consequences are rem-
iniscent of the old parlor puzzle: 'What's missing from this picture?' "62
The withering state of community is lamentable in light of research from
an array of disciplines revealing that "civic connections help make us
healthy, wealthy and wise."
63
Sociologists and psychologists report that people with a strong sense
of community64 are happier, worry less and feel more competent.65 Well-
being is enhanced appreciably when one feels part of a larger and depend-
able network of relationships. 66 By contrast, research suggests that the
decline in feelings of belonging and attachment to our neighborhoods is a
root cause of contemporary malaise, expressed in terms of loneliness,
alienation and isolation.
6 7
In recent years, researchers have carefully chronicled the growing
sense of civic discontent and accompanying distress at weakening commu-
nity bonds.68 Vast data on social, political and lifestyle trends reveal that
The Community Today: Place or Process, 14 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSVCHOL. 399, 403
(1986) (suggesting that community has not ceased to exist but its "voice is less
effective than it once was"); Philip Olson, Urban Neighborhood Research: Its Develop-
ment and Current Focus, 17 UU. Asr. Q. 491,504-06 (1982) (noting that decline and
transformation of urban neighborhoods as problematic both for society and for
sociological research).
62. PUTNAM, supra note 32, at 402-03.
63. Id. at 287. Psychologists make the point that a sense of community is es-
sential to good health, and that a diminished or absent sense of community leads
to depression, loneliness and alienation. See, e.g., SARASON, supra note 61, at 154
(addressing absence of sense of community as most frequent cause of loneliness,
stemming from lack of basis with which to identify with community); D.J. O'Brien
et al., Community Attachment and Depression Among Residents in Two Rural Midwestern
Communities, 59 RURAL Soc. 255, 255-65 (1994).
64. See Stephen E. Cochrun, Understanding and Enhancing Neighborhood Sense of
Community, 9J. PLAN. LITERATURE 92, 92 (1994) (discussing origin of term "sense of
community," coming from literature on community psychology, and referring to
strength of attachment, trust and belonging that individual feels for his or her
community or neighborhood). For a detailed discussion of the construct, see infra
notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
65. William B. Davidson & Patrick R. Cotter, The Relationship Between Sense of
Community and Subjective Well-Being: A First Look, 19 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 246,
246-53 (1991) (exploring connection between sense of community and psychologi-
cal well-being by studying small towns in South Carolina as well as city of Birming-
ham, Alabama).
66. See SARASON, supra note 61, at 153 (noting that positive sense of belonging
to larger community is rapidly deteriorating).
67. See id. at 154 (arguing that dilution of sense of community is responsible
for loneliness and destructive coping of individual problems).
68. See PUTNAM, supra note 32, at 287 (noting that Americans have growing
sense of disintegrating social bonds); Kenneth Heller, The Return to Community, 17
Am. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 1, 3-4 (1989) (defining community as multi-faceted
term and noting that lack of sense of community increases concern of societal
alienation); Daniel Yankelovich, New Rules in American Life: Searching for Self-Fulfil-
ment in a World Turned Upside Down, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 1981, at 35, 51-82 (dis-
11
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an overwhelming majority of the United States' workforce believes that
"'the breakdown of community' and 'selfishness'" are "'serious' or 'ex-
tremely serious' problems in America."69 Several national surveys report
that more than 80% of respondents think that "there should be more em-
phasis on community, even if that puts more demands on individuals."
70
B. The Value of a Sense of Community and Community of Place
The concept of "sense of community" has assumed significant impor-
tance in the field referred to, aptly, as "community psychology."7 1 The
term was introduced in the mid-1970s as "the overarching value by which
to judge [any community effort].",72 Sense of community has been ex-
plained as "the feeling an individual has about belonging to a group and
involves the strength of the attachment people feel for their communities
or neighborhoods. It is primarily a psychological construct; the presence
or absence of a sense of community is experienced as an abstract concept
in the human mind. '
73
Empirical research reveals that the experience of sense of community,
when activated, confers benefits to the individual as well as to the collec-
tive.7 4 Leading champions of this work urge us "to learn to use sense of
community as a tool for fostering understanding and cooperation."
75
With a sense of community in place, rigidity and distrust yield to con-
sciously cultivated tolerance and collaboration. Neighborhoods rich in
sense of community tend to "embody the qualities of safety, harmony, and
vitality.-"76
cussing desire for self-fulfillment as transforming American life as well as societal
norms).
69. PUTNAM, supra note 32, at 25 (citations omitted).
70. Id. (citations omitted).
71. See, e.g., Cochrun, supra note 64, at 92-93 (describing value of sense of
community in community psychology); Thomas J. Glynn, Neighborhood and Sense of
Community, 14 AM.J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 341, 341 (1986) (noting that interest in
community psychology is developing and growing because of loss of sense of com-
munity in contemporary society); W.J. Goudy, The Ideal and the Actual Community:
Evaluations from Small Town Residents, 18 Am. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 277, 285
(1990) (discussing results of study supporting existence of psychological sense of
ideal community).
72. SARASON, supra note 61, at 9.
73. Cochrun, supra note 64, at 93 (citations omitted).
74. See Glynn, supra note 71, at 341 (describing psychological sense of com-
munity as common theme and subject of interest in contemporary society); David
W. McMillan & David M. Chavis, Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory, 14 AM.
J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 6, 6 (1986) (indicating positive relationship between sense
of community and ability to function competently in community).
75. McMillan & Chavis, supra note 74, at 20.
76. Cochrun, supra note 64, at 98.
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Prior to the twentieth century phenomena of industrialization and
urbanization, sense of community was a natural part of daily life.77 His-
torians describe the ancient Greek polis as "a mecca of connectedness,"
where frequent interaction, loyalty and trust contributed to a strong sense
of community. 78 Later, agrarian life relied predominantly on interdepen-
dence, norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness. 79 Sense of community
was intrinsically felt, "closely woven into the fabric of tradition and moral-
ity as to be scarcely more noticeable than the air people breathe."
80
Post-industrial changes eviscerated many of the pre-determinants of
community. 8 1 The consensus from a myriad of disciplines is that today
"sense of community is no longer a natural by-product of daily life; sense
of community must be consciously defined and understood if it is to be
maintained and enhanced in modern society."'82 Communitarians warn
that our social environment, much like our ecological environment, can
no longer be taken for granted, and instead must be actively nurtured if
not revived wholesale. 8 3 The good news comes from empirical work sug-
gesting that strategies and techniques exist to effectively accomplish this
reactivation. 8
4
People "can have a psychological sense of community in a variety of
contexts. They can have such a sense about a geographically defined terri-
tory like their neighborhood, or about an aspatial or extended space com-
munity, for example, their church, job, professional group, or those
77. See, e.g., METROPOLITAN AMERICA IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 24 (Amos
H. Hawley & Vincent P. Rock eds., 1975) (noting that metropolitan growth is
changing concept of community from agricultural to urban).
78. SeeJohn Samples, Introduction to the Transaction Edition, in FERDINAND TON-
NIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY xvi (1957) (examining historians' approaches to
forms of community dating back to classical tradition).
79. See ROBERT A. NISBET, COMMUNITY AND POWER 82 (1962) (emphasizing
that system of agriculture is communal where history indicates few alternatives
than for villagers to subordinate to group for benefit of convenience and
necessity).
80. Cochrun, supra note 64, at 92 (quoting NISBET, supra note 79, at 57).
81. See THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 45
(1978) (engaging in historical and analytical examination of changing sense of
community in United States); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 23145 (1985) (chronicling post-industrial
changes in housing patterns and post-World War II boom in suburban
development).
82. Cochrun, supra note 64, at 92.
83. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES,
AND THE COMMUNITARAN AGENDA 123-33 (1993) (analyzing measures society can
take to return to balance of diversity and unity in community).
84. See Glynn, supra note 71, at 351 (describing community-wide actions such
as ability to elect officials who care about one's neighborhood, as aid in diminish-
ing common theme of community erosion); McMillan & Chavis, supra note 74, at
19 (analyzing various methods employed by specific groups within neighborhoods
to develop stronger sense of community). For a discussion of empirical work sup-
porting common constructs that build and can aid in re-building community, see
infra notes 169-242 and accompanying text.
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committed to a certain lifestyle." 8 5 The former category is referred to as
"community of place" and the latter as "community of interest."86
Before the advent of modern transportation and communication
technologies, these two categories were largely inseparable, as "people
lived, worked and built social networks within a limited geographic
area."8 7 The observation has been made that the decline in a sense of
community may be attributable at least in part to "an improper balance
between local and centralized levels of interaction-that is, a misalign-
ment between a person's community of place and community of
interest."8 8
This Article, with its focus on common interest communities, is con-
cerned with "community of place." Theorists maintain that it is in this
context that planners have the more significant potential to affect and
influence sense of community.89 The rewards of doing so are great.
People who have a strong sense of community feel like they be-
long in their neighborhoods, they believe they exert some con-
trol over what happens in their neighborhoods while also feeling
influenced by what happens in them, and they believe that their
needs can be met through the collective capabilities of their
neighbors. Through their sense of a shared history, people with
a strong sense of community also feel a strong emotional bond to
and a personal investment in the success of their
neighborhoods.9"
The sociological and psychological literature is replete with instru-
ments or "social measures" intended to help planners "identify the effects
of their plans and policies on resident practices and perceptions of com-
munity."9 1 These instruments allow respondents to indicate the intensity
85. Jack L. Nasar & David A. Julian, The Psychological Sense of Community -in the
Neighborhood, 61 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 178, 179 (1995); see also Heller, supra note 68, at
3 (describing community of interest as marked by personal ties and community of
place as defined by geographic territory).
86. See, e.g., LYNNE C. BURKHART, OLD VALUES IN A NEW TOWN: THE POLITICS
OF RACE AND CLASS IN COLUMBIA, MARYLAND 151 (1981) (describing community of
interest, in which individuals seek out like-minded groups); David M. Chavis et al.,
A Sense of Community Through Brunswik's Lens, 14 AM.J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 24, 26(1986) (articulating sense of community as expanding outside locality and includ-
ing communities based on interest, profession and race); Cochrun, supra note 64,
at 92 (noting that community of interest is defined by personal relationships).
87. Cochrun, supra note 64, at 92.
88. Id.
89. See David M. Chavis & Abraham Wandersman, Sense of Community in the
Urban Environment: A Catalyst for Participation and Community Development, 18 AM. J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 55, 56 (1990) (describing community development process
as connected to physical and social environment of community and arguing that
stronger sense of community provides planners with greater influences).
90. Cochrun, supra note 64, at 93.
91. See, e.g.,John C. Buckner, The Development of an Instrument to Measure Neigh-
borhood Cohesion, 16 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 771, 772 (1988) (discussing devel-
[Vol. 47: p. 553
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of their agreement or disagreement with itemized factors such as the pres-
ence of supportive relationships in the given area, individual involvement
in the community, the quality of interaction among residents, the number
of neighbors known by name and the number of neighbors considered
friends.9 2 These scales, when tested, reveal that the stronger the so-called
"social capital" 93 in a given area the greater the sense of community
among its members.9 4
C. Social Capital
"Social capital" is a term used by researchers9 5 in a host of disciplines
to refer to the value and benefits of "social networks and the norms of
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them."9 6 The term incor-
opment of instruments designed to measure attributes of community, thereby
making community analysis easier); Thomas J. Glynn, Psychological Sense of Commu-
nity: Measurement and Application, 34 HUM. REL. 789, 807 (1981) (noting that sense
of community may be considered as measurable as behaviors and attitudes);
Goudy, supra note 71, at 277 (analyzing subjective evaluations of sociological crite-
ria thought to indicate ideal community); McMillan & Chavis, supra note 74, at 19
(concluding that clear and empirically validated understanding of sense of com-
munity provides basis for planners to develop programs); Nasar & Julian, supra
note 85, at 179 (assessing psychological sense of community using short-form mea-
sure in study of sample residents); see also DENNIS E. POPLIN, COMMUNITIES: A SUR-
VEY OF THEORIES AND METHODS OF RESEARCH 291 (2d ed. 1979) (introducing
methods of community research and examination); CAROLYN R. SHAFFER & KRISTIN
ANUNDSEN, CREATING COMMUNITY ANYWHERE: FINDING SUPPORT AND CONNECTION IN
A FRAGMENTED WORLD 208-09 (1993) (creating "how-to" guide to building and
strengthening community bonds); Colin Bell & Howard Newby, Community Studies:
An Introduction to the Sociology of the Local Community, in 5 STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY 218,
218 (Professor W.M. Williams ed., 1971) (describing important early formulation
of community study as methodology).
92. See Glynn, supra note 91, at 807-08 (describing results of study measuring
psychological sense of community which can provide specific information for pro-
gram planning); Goudy, supra note 71, at 285-86 (discussing results of study indi-
cating sociological attributes that separate ideal community from actual
community).
93. For a discussion of social capital being advantageous to a strong sense of
community, see infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
94. For a discussion of essential attributes necessary to develop and maintain
a strong sense of community, see infra notes 169-242 and accompanying text.
95. SeeJANEJACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 55 (1961)
(being one of first to coin term). Professor Jacobs, an early proponent of what is
now considered "new urbanism," believed that the physical design of communities
should enhance and encourage informal contacts among neighbors, the sum total
of which would build "a web of public respect and trust, and a resource in time of
personal and neighborhood need." Id. at 56. Later, Professor James S. Coleman
applied the concept of social capital to education, to demonstrate how the educa-
tional process is enriched and improved by social ties. See JAMES S. COLEMAN,
FOUNDATIONS OF SocIAL THEORY 349-52 (1990) (describing post-World War II so-
cial changes that have undermined social capital necessary to accept and abide by
implicit constitutions in schools). See generally James S. Coleman, Social Capital in
the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM.J. Soc. 95, 95 (1988) (introducing concept of
social capital and examining social structure conditions under which it arises).
96. PUTNAM, supra note 32, at 19.
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porates notions of civic virtue and highlights "the fact that civic virtue is
most powerful when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social
relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not neces-
sarily rich in social capital."97
The first benefit of social capital is that it imposes norms and net-
works to help people more effectively address and, when necessary, re-
dress collective dilemmas. These social norms and relationships
encourage cooperation and inspire voluntary compliance with the sort of
behavior that is in the collective's best interests. A community rich in so-
cial capital will rely on informal social controls to solve problems. 98
Second, social capital is desirable because by "greas[ing] the wheels
that allow communities to advance smoothly"99 it reduces transaction
costs. "Where people are trusting and trustworthy, and where they are
subject to repeated interactions with fellow citizens, everyday business and
social transactions are less costly." 10 0
Third, social capital expands "our awareness of the many ways in
which our fates are linked,"10 ' thereby encouraging tolerance and empa-
thy. By contrast, loners and isolationists, their views untested, "are more
likely to be swayed by their worst impulses." 0 2
Notwithstanding its benefits, however, social capital too "can be di-
rected toward malevolent, antisocial purposes, just like any other form of
capital." 10 3 Further, there is always the risk that emphasizing the creation
of community will inadvertently encourage sameness and exclusion, be-
cause social capital is no doubt easier to build in homogeneous settings.
To maximize the benefits of social capital and minimize its potential to
foster division and generate other negative external effects, researchers
make an important "distinction between bridging (or inclusive) and bond-
ing (or exclusive)" social capital. 10 4
The upside of bonding social capital is that it can promote in-group
solidarity and loyalty as well as provide support for worthy start-up ventures
and otherwise disempowered groups. 10 5 A significant downside is its abil-
97. Id.
98. See OscAR NEWMAN, COMMUNITY OF INTEREST 13 (1981) (explaining that in
societies today, where neighbors are strangers, grouping dwellings for residents of
similar age and lifestyle may be only way to ensure common interests among neigh-
bors); see alsoJAcoBs, supra note 95, at 56 (noting necessity of community support
and development of trust through advice of fellow citizens); McMillan & Chavis,
supra note 74, at 15-16 (recognizing enjoyment of helping others as necessary rein-
forcement in developing successful communities).
99. PuTNAm, supra note 32, at 288.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 289.
103. Id. at 22.
104. Id.
105. See id. (explaining, by example, that bonding social capital can "provide
crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the commu-
[Vol. 47: p. 553
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ity to inspire "strong out-group antagonism."10 6 Bridging social capital, in
contrast, reaches across customary lines of demarcation to "encompass
people across diverse social cleavages.' 0 7 It promotes cooperation,
shared understanding and discovery of common ground.
Empirical accounts reflect the reality that "bonding and bridging are
not 'either-or' categories into which social networks can be neatly divided,
but 'more or less' dimensions along which we can compare different
forms of social capital."10 8 The emphasis, although somewhat imprecise,
is on bridge-building, so that broader alliances and identities are forged.
Systems of reciprocity encourage this sort of connectedness.
D. Systems of Reciprocity
An essential building-block of social capital is the norm of "genera-
lized reciprocity,"1 09 perhaps best described by the age-old rule "Do unto
others as you would have them do unto you." A sense of community relies
on this norm to help satisfy what is described by community psychologists
as a fundamental human desire to feel interdependent with others, and
then "maintain this interdependence by doing for others what one expects
from them."' Examples of the principle in practice might include pick-
ing up your neighbor's mail while she is away, keeping an eye on a neigh-
bor's house in his absence, or "raking your leaves before they blow onto
your neighbors' yard."1 1'
In a significant exploration of social order, reciprocity is described as
an essential characteristic of community, and covers "a range of arrange-
ments and relations and exchanges, including mutual aid, some forms of
cooperation and some forms of sharing."1 2 This notion of "mutual aid" is
explained as follows:
Each individual act in a system of reciprocity is usually character-
ized by a combination of what one might call short-term altruism
and long-term self-interest: I help you out now in the (possibly
vague, uncertain, and uncalculating) expectation that you will
help me out in the future. Reciprocity is made up of a series of
acts each of which is short-run altruistic (benefiting others at a
nity, while furnishing start-up financing, markets, and reliable labor for local
entrepreneurs").
106. Id. at 23.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id. at 23.
109. See id. at 134 (describing generalized reciprocity as "[t]he touchstone of
social capital," defining it this way: "I'll do this for you now, without expecting
anything immediately in return and perhaps without even knowing you, confident
that down the road you or someone else will return the favor.").
110. SARASON, supra note 61, at 157.
111. PuTNAM, supra note 32, at 135.
112. MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBERTY 28 (1982).
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cost to the altruist), but which together typically make every par-
ticipant better off."1
3
Reciprocity has been cast in terms of Alexis de Tocqueville's observa-
tion that American democracy functions well because we pursue "self-in-
terest rightly understood."' 14  Thus, generalized reciprocity is like
altruism, but members of a community that practice its tenets discover
that their own self-interest is served too, whether the gain is immediate,
long-term or attenuated. 115 "When each of us can relax her guard a little,
what economists term 'transaction costs'-the costs of the everyday busi-
ness of life, as well as the costs of commercial transactions-are re-
duced."1 16 Trusting communities, then, "have a measurable economic
advantage." 1 17
The almost imperceptible background stress of daily "transaction
costs"-from worrying about whether you got back the right
change from the clerk to double-checking that you locked the
car door-may also help explain why students of public health
find that life expectancy itself is enhanced in more trustful com-
munities. A society that relies on generalized reciprocity is more
efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that
money is more efficient than barter. Honesty and trust lubricate
the inevitable frictions of social life. 118
Trust is an important anchor of community.'19 Without it, the poten-
tial for rigidity, dissension and strife escalates.' 20 Closely knit communi-
ties tend to inspire trust and cooperation because members are likely to
have multiple dealings with each other mindful that reputations count.12 1
In contrast, communities with weak social fabric have little leverage availa-
ble to support norms of "good citizenship." In other words, "the civically
disengaged believe themselves to be surrounded by miscreants and feel
less constrained to be honest themselves."' 22
113. Id. at 28-29.
114. PUTNAM, supra note 32, at 135 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA 525 (1839)).
115. See id. (acknowledging generalized reciprocity as more difficult to distin-
guish from altruism when return of favor is long-term).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See MARK BALDASSARE, TROUBLE IN PARADISE: THE SUBURBAN TRANSFORMA-
TION IN AMERICA 101 (1986) (discussing several important roles that trust plays in
human relations).
120. See id. (warning of dangers associated with absence of trust).
121. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 Am. J. Soc. 481, 490 (1985) (establishing reputation as incentive
in diminishing opportunity for malfeasance).
122. PUTNAM, supra note 32, at 137.
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A system of reciprocity builds friendships, which is another important
dimension of community. Friendship "involves mutual concern, and al-
though 'the reciprocity of friendship means that one gets back what one
gives,' there is no calculation of benefits and costs. It requires an approxi-
mate equality and strong, secure selves."' 23 Friendships allow members of
a community to experience "the goodness of others while demonstrating
goodness to them."12 4
III. PRIVATIZATION, COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES AND THE
LuRE OF COMMUNITY
In this age of increasing depersonalization and isolation, the lure of
community is real and very appealing. The prevalence of common inter-
est communities is linked, in significant ways, to this larger search for con-
nection, community and sense of place. That advertisements for CICs,
posted on the Internet and elsewhere, use this longing to sell community
is no accident. For example, one advertisement states, "Remember the
street you grew up on? Where neighbors knew neighbors. Live there
again-at Greenfield at The Wheatlands. Greenfield is a traditional
hometown for families who aspire to the good life."' 25
The Disney Company's pitch for its "Celebration" community
promises the return of vintage neighborliness. Its advertisement remi-
nisces, "There once was a place where neighbors greeted neighbors in the
quiet of summer twilight ... Where children chased fireflies .... The
movie house showed cartoons on Saturday. The grocery store delivered
.... Remember that place? ... It held a magic all its own. The special
magic of an American hometown."1 26 Two recent books offer insiders'
perspectives on life in Disney's model towns. 127 A significant part of the
allure of these planned developments is described as the yearning to live
in a more civil, more caring place.' 28
Sadly, common interest communities, as presently configured, are
hard-pressed to provide any genuine sense of community or connection.
This fundamental default has allowed tensions to mount and battles to
123. TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 31.
124. Id.; see also C. FISCHER, To DWELL AMONG FRIENDS 2-5 (1982) (chroni-
cling importance of personal connection as necessary component of community
life).
125. www.concordhomes.com/co/cogreenfield.html (on file with author).
126. Kirp, supra note 17, at 22.
127. See generally DOUGLAS FRANTZ & CATHERINE COLLINS, CELEBRATION,
U.S.A.: LIVING IN DISNEY'S BRAVE NEW TOWN (1999) (describing their experiences
as residents of Disney's new town of Celebration); ANDREW Ross, THE CELEBRATION
CHRONICLES: LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF PROPERTY VALUE IN DISNEY'S NEW
ToWN (1999) (analyzing troubles associated with life in model Disney town).
128. Ross, supra note 127, at 34 (noting that homeowners in planned devel-
opments are willing to gain "sense of community" in exchange for smaller house
and lot).
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escalate.' 2 9 Addressing this central CIC failure is of immediate and long-
term relevance. Restoring social bonds and repairing damaged social
fabric is essential to our individual and collective well-being. Moreover,
the inability of common interest communities to live up to their rhetoric is
compounding transaction costs as the burdens on social and legal systems
grow.
In this vast arena, critical study and commitment to reform is well
worth the effort. Notwithstanding their paradigmatic and practical short-
comings, common interest communities, in one form or another, are a
force to be reckoned with. Demographic trends lead inescapably to the
conclusion that "[w]hether one focuses on the housing pattern in large
cities or upon suburbia ...the age of community association living, as
opposed to renting or owning a one-family home, is upon us.' 30
A. Trouble in Common Interest Community Paradise
With increased frequency, common interest community residents are
balking at the restrictions to accompany association living.' 3 ' A practi-
tioner on the front lines cites to the "growing trend" of residents "fighting
back against associations." 13 2 Others describe this trend as a "budding na-
tional backlash,' 33 "turning serene subdivisions into raucous battle
zones."134
At a concomitant rate, courts are awkwardly entering the fray as the
reluctant arbiters of chagrined complainants' challenges to the propriety
129. For a discussion of the tensions of CIC living, see infra notes 131-57 and
accompanying text.
130. Rohan, supra note 4, at 5.
131. See ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMU-
NITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 135-41 (1992) (describing CIC re-
sidents' dissatisfaction); Judd, supra note 18, at 158 (chronicling homeowners'
associations "tendency toward autocratic rule" and resultant litigation or threats of
litigation); Kleinfield & Rozhon, supra note 21, at Al (describing New York's intra-
co-op disputes); Trognitz, "Yes, It's My Castle", supra note 4, at 30 (noting that law-
suits by unhappy residents against homeowners' associations are growing); Tim
Vanderpool, But Isn't This My Yard? Revolt Against Neighborhood Rules, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 18, 1999, at 2 ("[H]eavy handed rules and arbitrary enforce-
ment are sometimes blamed for pitting neighbor against neighbor, and turning
serene subdivisions into raucous battle zones. The result may be a budding na-
tional backlash."); Weakland, supra note 12, at 310-26 (describing "litigation-
plagued" CIC in Los Angeles).
132. Trognitz, "Yes, It's My Castle", supra note 4, at 30 (quoting Fairfax, Vir-
ginia attorney Wilbert Washington, II).
133. Vanderpool, supra note 131, at 2; see also Trognitz, "Yes, It's My Castle",
supra note 4, at 31 (quoting Nevada State Senator Mike Schneider, who said
"There is a backlash by the public toward these homeowner associations," and Cali-
fornia practitioner, Alexandria Phillips, who stated that "There's going to be a
backlash as long as there is an abuse of power").
134. Vanderpool, supra note 131, at 2.
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of given rules and association or board actions to enforce them.13 5 A sur-
vey of 600 homeowners' associations discovered that "more than 44% of
the boards had been threatened with lawsuits in a year's time."' 36 Con-
versely, "homeowners' associations are increasingly using the courts to
make wayward residents comply with rules dictating everything from home
colors to fences."13 7 Conflicts are not limited, however, to residents suing
associations or associations suing residents. Increasingly, neighbors are
turning on each other. 138
The trend toward litigation and state statutory intervention,' 3 9 cou-
pled with erupting patterns of dissension, supports the premise that
"something is rotten" in CIC-land.140 Reported instances of trouble in
paradise abound. Newspapers and periodicals tell the story of how CIC
residents "are increasingly jumping the fence of civility." 1 4  The pub-
lished accounts are troublesome and telling.
For example, a couple living in a California subdivision returned from
vacation to find that their board had, without warning, retained a land-
scaper to cut down their three very expensive pine trees. Apparently, a
neighbor complained that the trees were in violation of one of the devel-
opment's restrictive covenants prohibiting foliage from blocking views,
this notwithstanding the fact that the association had approved the trees in
the first place. The couple has taken their grievance to court. 142
135. Many courts apply a rule of reasonableness to common interest commu-
nity rules, and will not disturb a given restriction unless it lacks a sufficient factual
basis or is rendered in bad faith. See, e.g., Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman,
309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding restriction as reasonable
and in good faith); Riss v. Angel, 934 P.2d 669, 684 (Wash. 1997) (striking down
board decision because it lacked sufficient factual basis); see also David C. Drewes,
Note, Putting the "Community" Back in Common Interest Communities: A Proposal for
Participation-Enhancing Procedural Review, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 314, 349-50 (2001)
(proposing that judiciary encourage participatory CIC governance by varying stan-
dard of review based upon presence or absence of participatory procedures in as-
sociation's decision-making process); Paula A. Franzese, Common Interest
Communities: Standards of Review and Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
663, 666-71 (2000) (detailing standards of review adopted by courts to review com-
mon interest community rules and governing board actions and proposing multi-
factored test to honor resident expectations as well as best interests of collective).
136. Judd, supra note 18, at 158.
137. Maureen Feighan, Fight over Rights Gets Unneighborly, Lawsuits Grow As
Homeowner Groups Enforce Rules, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 22, 2000, at Al.
138. See id. (showing trend of neighbors turning on each other); Harvey Rice,
lurry of Lawsuits Divides Carriage Hill Neighbors, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 3, 2000, at A43
(explaining dissension between neighbors).
139. For a discussion of new resident protection laws, see infra notes 158-61
and accompanying text.
140. For a discussion of examples of the trend towards litigation, see infra
notes 142-57 and accompanying text.
141. Vanderpool, supra note 131, at 2.
142. See Trognitz, "Yes, It's My Castle", supra note 4, at 30 (explaining how
Bergen family's trees were cut down).
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Elsewhere, "clipboard wielding board members" zealously patrol in
search of CC&R violations, which are reported "on little blue cards" and
sent to owners.143 In the words of one disgruntled resident, who incurred
the board's wrath for putting a big red stuffed dog on his porch during
the holidays, "I grew up and moved away from Mom and Dad a long time
ago.... The blue card is like 'clean up your room.'"144
In another community, an angry resident tells of a conflict that
"started with a fresh coat of paint to an old gate. Now, after two years of
battling his homeowners' association over the color he chose-off-white to
match his house-[he] says he is ready to pack up and move out."145 In
Atlanta, Georgia, a family recounts that its homeowners' association fined
them $25 per day "for having green grass in winter."' 46 An applicable
covenant obliges residents to plant Bermuda sod in their front yards,
which turns a telltale dormant brown during the winter months. 1 47
In Charlotte, North Carolina, a condominium owner was fined $75
per day by his homeowners' association because his dog exceeded the
weight limitations imposed by covenant. 148 $11,000 in fines forced him to
declare bankruptcy.149 When a Houston, Texas, CIC resident who was suf-
fering from a brain tumor fell behind on' $600 in dues, his association
sued him, generating $4,600 in legal fees. "When he couldn't pay in time,
the association sold his house, valued at $55,000, for $17,000."150 Later,
the foreclosure was voided. 151
In many communities, the neighbors are the ones who take on the
role of zealous enforcers. Using missiles to kill mice, petty quarrels can
become the basis for the imposition of stiff fines and protracted litiga-
tion.1 52 For example, in an Arizona planned community, one neighbor
turned in another for installing a modest solar panel. The association de-
clared the installation an eyesore and demanded its removal. A lawsuit
erupted, generating more than $100,000 in legal fees. The resident won,
"but the association vows to fight on."' 53 Other even more disturbing in-
stances of neighbors turning on neighbors abound. In a Michigan CIC, a
143. See Razzi, supra note 20, at 88 (discussing how homeowners associations
have great power over homeowners).
144. Id.
145. Vanderpool, supra note 131, at 2.
146. Duane D. Stanford, Covenants a Basis for Turf Battles, ATLANTA J. &
CoNsr., May 8, 2000, at IA.
147. See id. (describing requirement that certain type of grass be planted).
148. See Laura Williams-Tracy, Covenants Gain Clout in Neighborhood Governance,
Bus. J., Sept. 8, 2000, at 27 (noting that homeowner's dog "deemed too large" for
his complex).
149. See id. (noting rule's impact on homeowner).
150. Benjamin, supra note 26, at 57.
151. See id. (highlighting fact that foreclosure was voided).
152. See id. (stating that "disagreements over these neighborhood covenants
are growing much more serious than simple spats").
153. Id.
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couple who painted their home purple (their favorite color) had sand
dumped in their pool, their mailbox vandalized and their car stolen.
154
In Arizona, a support group called "Homeowners Supporting Home-
owners in Associations" has adopted a purple flamingo as a symbol of soli-
darity and protest against associations and boards. 15 5 The group's
founder, chagrined by association overreaching, has one in his front yard,
'just to bug the association," and has sold at least 100 of the flamboyant
steel sculptures to other irked residents.156 The term "No HOA" (mean-
ing, "No Homeowners' Association") is starting to appear in real estate ads
because, in the words of one realtor, "[f]or most people it is a real selling
point.'
5 7
Increasing levels of acrimony and conflict have prompted some state
legislatures to intervene "in the name of consumer protections. State leg-
islation governs issues such as RCA [Residential Community Association]
and member tort liability, association self-dealing, and the required disclo-
sure of the RCA structure and powers."1 58 Across the nation, legislatures
are considering other bills to curb overreaching restrictions and poten-
tially troublesome association and board action.
For example, in Nevada, legislative enactments have created an
ombudsman's office to assist CIC residents with association problems and
to require that association managers be licensed. 1 59 "In Vermont, a 'right
to dry' bill was introduced last year that would void most prohibitions on
clotheslines .... [11n Virginia, legislation has been proposed that would
make it a misdemeanor for any entity or locality to prohibit a homeowner
from flying the American flag."' 6 0 In California, legislation was recently
enacted to prohibit associations from banning pets. 16 1
These patchwork legislative solutions and judicial responses are en-
deavoring to do the work that is best left to informal networks and social
capital. The need for formal intervention is attributable in considerable
part to the breakdown, if not wholesale depletion, of these touchstones of
community. The traditional CIC paradigm does little to inspire trust, a
bulwark of community, and provides few, if any, tools to build a sense of
interdependence, collective responsibility and cooperation. In this re-
154. See Feighan, supra note 137, at Al (telling tale of vandalism to couple's
home and property).
155. See Razzi, supra note 20, at 88.
156. See id. (describing actions taken against homeowners association).
157. Id.
158. A. Dan Tarlock, Residential Community Associations and Land Use Controls,
in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOcIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL SYSTEM?, supra note 22, at 75, 76.
159. See id. (providing example of legislative action intended to assist associa-
tion residents).
160. Trognitz, "Yes, It's My Castle", supra note 4, at 31.
161. See Benjamin, supra note 26, at 58 (describing new legislation forbidding
homeowners associations from prohibiting pets).
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gard, the dynamics and benefits of successful community building offer
insight and provide guidance for reform.
B. Privatization and the Unrealized Determinants of Community
"Community" has been described as "a horribly 'open-textured' con-
cept, that is to say there is not and there cannot be an exhaustive specifica-
tion of the conditions for its correct use."' 62 Nonetheless, even those
inclined to be more circumspect do concede that there are certain central
or shared characteristics of community, "attributes or characteristics pos-
sessed in some degree by all communities." 1 63 Further, research suggests
that it is possible to consciously direct and then nurture sense of
community.
1 64
Significantly, two leading studies found constancy even among very
diverse neighborhoods in the social variables likely to build community or,
according to respondents, contribute to an "ideal community. '165 One
study compared three very different communities: Greenbelt, Maryland, a
planned community of 18,000; Hyattsville, Maryland, a less affluent suburb
of Washington, D.C. with a population of 16,000; and Kfar Blum, a 1,100
member kibbutz near Israel's Golan Heights. 166 Across the board, re-
sidents' actual experiences of community were remarkably similar to their
ideal. 1 67 The later second study revealed consistency across twenty-seven
diverse neighborhoods.
1 68
162. TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 2.
163. Id. at 26; see D.M. HUMMON, COMMONPLACES: COMMUNITY IDEOLOGY AND
IDENTITY IN AMERICAN CULTURE 1-13 (1990) (understanding how people define
community and relate to each other in cities, suburbs and small towns); R.L. WAR-
REN, THE COMMUNITY IN AMERICA 9-14 (1972) (setting forth model for analytical
study of community and community change); Karim Benammar, Absences of Com-
munity, in WHO Is THIS "WE"? 31, 31-41 (Eleanor M. Godway & Geraldine Finn
eds., 1994) (studying instances where cohesiveness is absent, aiming to provide
enhanced understanding of what actually does build and encourage community);
Daphne Spain, Been-Heres Versus Come-Heres: Negotiating Conflicting Community Identi-
ties, 59 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 156, 157-59 (1993) (describing how study of residents'
conflict contributes to understanding of community). See generally EMILIA E. MARTI-
NEz-BRAWLEY, PERSPECTIVES ON THE SMALL COMMUNITY: HUMANISTIC VIEWS FOR
PRACTITIONERS (1990) (examining meaning of community and small community
relationships).
164. For a discussion of important determinants of community, see infra
notes 169-242 and accompanying text.
165. See Glynn, supra note 91, at 789 (finding similar characteristics of com-
munity in diverse neighborhoods); Goudy, supra note 71, at 277 (testing theory
using small-town residents).
166. See Glynn, supra note 91, at 789-818 (illustrating idea that similar vari-
ables constitute ideal community even among diverse communities).
167. See id. (finding similarities in actual and ideal sense of community).
168. See Goudy, supra note 71, at 279-85 (showing commonality in sense of
community).
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Additional empirical work supports the premise that there is a com-
monality of constructs that build community.' 69 The most important of
these have been identified as 1) the sense of belonging, or membership; 2)
the feeling of having some control with respect to what takes place, or
influence, 3) the belief that one's needs will be met as one contributes to
meeting others' needs, or integration and fulfillment of needs;, and 4) the
sense of shared history as well as the quality of interaction, or shared emo-
tional connection.1 70 These factors, when present even in part, confer sig-
nificant private as well as public gains. 1 7 1 Each will be explored and then
applied as a helpful lens through which to view common interest commu-
nity deficiencies and set an agenda for reform.
1. Membership
Membership has been described as "a sense of shared destiny within
the territorial community."1 7 2 Two of the most important predicates to
experiencing this sense of membership or belonging are personal invest-
ment and the establishment of boundaries that delineate and mark the
given community as separate and distinct from the world at large. 1 7 3 Per-
169. See, e.g., Chavis & Wandersman, supra note 89, at 56-81 (evaluating three
components of community, including one's perception of environment, social re-
lations and perceived control and empowerment within community); Davidson &
Cotter, supra note 65, at 246-53 (analyzing relationship between sense of commu-
nity and happiness); McMillan & Chavis, supra note 74, at 6-23 (indicating that
strongest predictors are length of residency, satisfaction and number of neighbors
known by first name); Grace M. H. Pretty, Relating Psychological Sense of Community to
Social Climate Characteristics, 18 AM.J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 60, 61-65 (1990) (iden-
tifying factors that influence sense of community); Stephanie Riger & Paul J.
Lavrakas, Community Ties: Patterns of Attachment and Social Interaction in Urban Neigh-
borhoods, 9 Am. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 55, 55-57 (1981) (determining factors af-
fecting attainment of community); Oddvar Skjaeveland et al., A Multidimensional
Measure of Neighboring, 24 Am.J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 413, 422-25 (1996) (measur-
ing factors that contribute to sense of community).
170. See McMillan & Chavis, supra note 74, at 9-14 (identifying four most im-
portant elements of community); see also Leanne Rivlin, The Neighborhood, Personal
Identity, and Group Affiliations, in 9 HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND ENVIRONMENT: ADVANCES
IN THEORY IN RESEARCH: NEIGHBORHOOD AND COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTS 1, 1-8 (Ir-
win Altman & Abraham Wandersman eds., 1987) (emphasizing importance of
community members' bonding with each other, and exploring potential for con-
flict that can arise in neighborhoods).
171. See generally Baldassare & Fischer, supra note 58, at 314-15 (noting that
well-connected community is, among other things, more efficient); McMillan &
Chavis, supra note 74, at 9 (stating that these four factors contribute to feeling of
belonging among each member of group and shared faith among group as whole
of commitment to be together).
172. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 32.
173. See McMillan & Chavis, supra note 74, at 9-11 (discussing how member-
ship has boundaries and how personal investment contributes to sense of commu-
nity); see also ROGER S. AHLBRANT, JR. & JAMES V. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW PUBLIC
POLICY FOR NEIGHBORHOOD PRESERVATION 8-9 (1979) (stating that boundaries con-
tribute to residents' sense of community); William B. Davidson & Patrick R. Cotter,
Measurement of Sense of Community Within the Sphere of City, 16 J. APPLIED Soc.
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sonal investment involves the expenditure of time, money and/or labor to
attain a place in the community. Thus, "[p]urchasing a home or under-
taking home improvements makes membership more meaningful and val-
uable to a neighborhood resident. 1 74 Neighborhood boundaries, such as
naming the community, providing a separate means of ingress to and
egress from the area, or otherwise marking the locale also help to develop
a sense of community. 175
Interestingly, both of these prerequisites are amply present in the
common interest community setting. In fact, CICs have been assailed for
their often exclusionary practices in staking out boundaries and rendering
access physically as well as economically prohibitive. 176 While CICs are
now available across a more diverse spectrum of economic brackets,1 77 the
investment of capital remains a condition precedent to admission. Typi-
cally, that capital represents the most significant financial investment that
the home or unit owner is likely to make. Attendantly, one would think
that residents' shared concern with preserving property values would also
be a significant factor in fostering a locality-based sense of belonging. 178
For that matter, the presence of boundaries is a defining hallmark in the
CIC setting, taking the usually benign form of naming the development
or, on a scale of extremes, the potentially more troublesome forms of
guard booths, guard rails, gates, and even walls.179
PSYCHOL. 608, 608-19 (1986) (stating that civic activities contribute to sense of
membership).
174. Cochrun, supra note 64, at 93.
175. See McMillan & Chavis, supra note 74, at 9-10 (explaining that neighbor-
hood boundaries protect residents against threats of nonresidents).
176. See, e.g., BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 8 (criticizing resort to gated
and walled communities and recognizing that gated, or private residential, com-
munities separate their residents from nonresidents); MCKENZIE, supra note 1, at
141, 186-87 (discussing CIC preoccupation with security measures); Judd, supra
note 18, at 155 (stating that CICs were "the means of continuing the housing in-
dustry's and the federal government's decades-old policies that segregated residen-
tial areas by income, social class, and race"); id. at 160 (comparing walled
communities to "walled cities of the medieval world, constructed to keep the
hordes at bay"); Kennedy, supra note 50, at 763 (concluding that "[r]esidential
associations cause harms to nonmembers by developing exclusive communities, by
gating formerly public streets and neighborhoods, and by increasing the fiscal bur-
dens of cities and states").
177. See Kennedy, supra note 50, at 767 n.34 (noting that residential associa-
tions in economically disadvantaged communities could be deterrent to crime).
178. See, e.g., Anthony F. Panzetta, The Concept of Community: The Short-Circuit of
the Mental Health Movement, 25 ARCHVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 291, 291-94 (1971) (stat-
ing that collective's interest in preserving property values is strong determinant of
sense of community of place); Jeanne M. Plas & Susan E. Lewis, Environmental Fac-
tors and Sense of Community in a Planned Town, 24 Am. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL., 109,
109-13 (1996) (suggesting that strength of community of place is based on prestige
and affluence of neighborhood).
179. See MCKENZIE, supra note 1, at 141-42 (describing one development as
"surrounded by six-foot block walls topped with two-foot-high bands of barbed
wire," with in excess of three hundred private security guards on patrol).
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While considered foundational factors, boundaries and personal in-
vestment, by themselves, will not build neighborhood attachment without
the additional presence of "social bonding and behavioral rootedness."
18 0
In other words, without social capital, membership does not have its
privileges.
Researchers report that "people who know their neighbors and feel
part of the neighborhood experience strong social bonding."1 81 Bonding
takes time and includes the expectation that one will continue to live in
the neighborhood for a significant period of time. Communities must be
stable to cultivate reciprocity. In studies, respondents who scored highest
on actual sense of community scales were those who knew many of their
neighbors and who believed that they would remain in the community for
some considerable duration.1 8 2
2. Influence
Residents experience a sense of community when they feel that they
have some modicum of influence in the community.18 3 The notion of
influence as a determinant of sense of community draws upon norms of
reciprocity. It refers to the success with which the community is able to
inspire and move the individual as well as the extent to which the individ-
ual is able to experience personal freedom and contribute to the establish-
ment of collective goals and norms. Influence, then, is the feeling that
one is autonomous and able to express his or her individuality while also
feeling part of the group by adhering to appropriate social norms.
To help build community, influence must be a two-way street. On the
one hand, residents feel pressure "to conform with certain social standards
or norms to fulfill their needs for consensual validation."' 8 4 . On the other
hand, each individual is made to feel that he or she has a say in the matter.
Thus, "an individual can influence a community, and the community can
influence the individual." 18 5
The premise that "[i].n tightly knit communities, researchers expect
to see both types of influence operating simultaneously" 18 6 is of central
importance to the common interest community reform dialogue. Shared
power and mutuality of influence, rather than rule by force, fiat or decla-
ration, leads to civic-mindedness, neighborhood cohesion and greater per-
180. See Cochrun, supra note 64, at 93 (citing Riger & Lavrakas, supra note
169, at 55-66).
181. Id.
182. See Glynn, supra note 91, at 789-93 (showing correlation between actual
sense of community and length of time one lives in community).
183. See Cochrun, supra note 64, at 94 (discussing power of influence of indi-
viduals in community).
184. Id. (citations omitted).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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sonal responsibility for the common good.' 8 7 A resident must have some
baseline sense of personal power and influence before he or she is able to
embrace a strong sense of community. 188
The concept of influence is related to another core component of
community, that of trust 1 89 "The existence of trust means that there is
agreement about the rules, actions, intentions, and expectations in local
settings."190 By contrast, when one is not in agreement with the rules and
feels powerless to change them, one is less inclined to trust. This premise
is of great relevance to the common interest community dilemma.
Considerable commentary and scholarly debate surround the issue of
whether or not participation in a CIC association is voluntary rather than
forced. Some maintain that common interest communities are intrinsi-
cally coercive in nature, depriving residents of meaningful choice because
of the relative scarcity of desirable housing alternatives in tight markets.1 91
By contrast, it has been asserted that the "decision to join [a homeown-
ers'] association is as voluntary as a human decision can be."1 9 2 This dia-
logue is best recast by asking whether or not existing CIC constructs and
practices promote sufficient mutuality of influence, which is an important
component of trust and a predicate to community-building.
187. See ETZIONI, supra note 83, at 253-67 (setting forth communitarian
objectives).
188. See Chavis & Wandersman, supra note 89, at 59 (stressing importance of
control and empowerment at individual level).
189. For a discussion of trust, see supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
190. BALDASSARE, supra note 119, at 101.
191. See Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 883, 900-02 (1988) (explaining how common interest communi-
ties are coercive); see also MCKENZIE, supra note 1, at 21 (characterizing homeowner
associations as "illiberal and undemocratic"); Gregory S. Alexander, Conditions of
"Voice": Passivity, Disappointment, and Democracy in Homeowner Associations, in COM-
MON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 145,
152 (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman eds., 1994) (arguing that "moral or-
der of modern suburbia is characterized by avoidance"); Brower, supra note 21, at
246-50 (recognizing that consent theories are "unrealistic").
192. Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1519, 1523 n.20 (1982); see also Richard Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 906, 922-25 (1988) (stating that freedom of contract should be
lens through which to view privately-bartered-for restrictions).
The declaration containing the recitation of covenants is required to be re-
corded. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (stating that
"[d]eclaration means the recorded document or documents containing the servi-
tudes that create and govern the common interest community"). Thus, the argu-
ment is made that buyers are at least on constructive notice of its contents, and
thereby have tacitly consented to its terms. See id. § 6.2 cmt. e (deducing that be-
cause documents are written, buyers have impliedly consented). In reality, many
residents are without actual notice of the declaration's contents, calling into de-
bate whether the commonly-imposed restrictions truly represent the general con-
sensus. See Winokur, supra note 49, at 59 & n.246 ("Most prospective owners do
not intelligently review the restrictions to which they subject themselves upon ac-
ceptance of a deed to land burdened by servitudes.").
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Viewed in this light, the traditional common interest community para-
digm, with its emphasis on the imposition of rules and regulations arrived
at without explicit consensus, is lopsided. Too often, "community" takes
the form of complicated regimes of restrictiveness and imperious gov-
erning bodies which endeavor to exert, influence without sufficient ave-
nues for the individual to do the same. There is not enough mutuality of
influence.
The "declaration" (a telling use of language) of covenants, conditions
and restrictions is established by the developer and recorded at the incep-
tion of the development, before residents have even purchased their
properties. 193 Trying to amend the declaration is a Herculean task. In
most instances, amendments require a supermajority vote, such as two-
thirds or greater.19 4
Further, many buyers are merely on record or constructive notice of
the declaration's contents, without having actually read the document.
Put mildly, often purchasers do not appreciate that a host of rules and
regulations may well prescribe (and proscribe) all sorts of conduct.195 In
a recent survey conducted by the Community Associations Institute, own-
ers' ignorance of governing restrictions ranked as one of the top three
causes of association discord. 19 6
Even residents with actual notice of the declaration's provisions, hav-
ing endeavored to navigate its murky contents, are likely to emerge con-
fused. The law of covenants has been explained by one of the brightest
thinkers as "the province only of a hardy band of real estate lawyers with
the temerity to master a complex and imposing body of rules."1 9 7 Across
the board, then, to conjecture that CIC buyers experience "a significant
component of innocent ignorance" is not a stretch. 198 Moreover, because
the declaration's terms are tied together as a package, "transaction costs
are certain to prevent buyers who dislike some terms to bargain to have
them removed before purchasing the property."1 99 Thus, the agreement
193. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 cmt. e (explaining
that declaration is written before any properties are sold); see also HYATr, supra
note 5, at xi (describing declaration document).
194. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.10 (2000) (noting
usual voting requirement, but also that sometimes unanimous consent is necessary
to amend declaration).
195. See Barton & Silverman, supra note 49, at 136 (noting that community
associations define and enforce neighborhood rules, some of which people wel-
come and some of which people resent).
196. See Wayne S. Hyatt, Creating Community in Community Association, in AL1-
ABA Course of Study: Drafting Documents for Condominiums, PUDs, and Golf Course Com-
munities, 1 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 443, 467 (2000) (reporting top three causes as "apathy,
lack of knowledge of the restrictions at the time of purchase, and a lack of under-
standing of the board's fiduciary duties").
197. Epstein, supra note 192, at 906.
198. Benjamin, supra note 26, at 57 (quoting practitioner and leading expert
Wayne Hyatt).
199. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 360 (2001).
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to purchase does not necessarily represent agreement with all or even
most of the terms of the declaration.
If the market is working perfectly, one might hope that purchas-
ers could find appropriate housing where they want to live that
contains the terms they want to find, but, in reality, the terms
created by developers may not magically line up with the de-
mands of all consumers. It is therefore arguable that this market
failure may justify a skeptical attitude to declaration terms that
seem onerous or go too far in limiting the legal rights of unit
owners to control their own units or to be free from control by
the community. 20 0
Surely, it is "difficult to develop a sense of place and purpose when
people feel they and their ideas 'just don't matter."' 20 ' Residents' lack of
perceived and actual influence contributes to the "laments of apathy, con-
flict and lack of participation" 20 2 that run as a common thread through
much of the literature on community associations. Notwithstanding their
inherent structure as "pseudo-governments" of sorts, they do not "breed
higher levels of participation and self-governance. "203
In this vein, the concept of influence as a predicate to building com-
munity is relevant to the academy's ongoing colloquy with respect to the
constitutional dimensions and implications of CIC living. Here, some
have concluded that homeowners' associations, notwithstanding their le-
gal status as nonprofit corporations, actually function as "private govern-
ments." 20 4 As defacto "state actors," the argument proceeds, they should
be required to satisfy due process, equal protection and first amendment
guarantees. 20 5 Some suggest that common interest community residents
200. Id.
201. Hyatt, supra note 196, at 463.
202. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 35.
203. Id.
204. See McKENzIE, supra note 1, at 122 (noting that "homeowner associations
have full legal rights, limited responsibility for the individuals who operate them, a
potentially infinite lifespan, and a dedication to . . .protection of property val-
ues"); Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 29, at 634-41 (arguing that community asso-
ciation is quasi-government paralleling powers, duties and responsibilities of
municipal government). In carrying out this purpose, homeowner associations
function as private governments. See Brower, supra note 21, at 203 (arguing for
stricter judicial review); Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 11, at 511-16 (examining CIC
governing board actions as possible state action).
205. See Kennedy, supra note 50, at 778-93 (arguing that residential associa-
tions are virtual governments); Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An
Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 253, 253-54 (1976) (suggesting framework for
future regulation); Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the
Recognition of Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After
Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 461, 462 (1998) (arguing under
various theories that homeowners associations could be considered state actors).
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ought to be afforded a bill of rights. 20 6 At a minimum, associations need
to be subject to some meaningful system of checks and balances.
The phenomenon of privatization and the increasing role played by
common interest communities as local governments (of sorts) may be at-
tributed in part to citizens' otherwise unsatisfied desires to feel influential.
Studies report that "[p]eople often feel like they have no influence over
large entities like states or federal governments, but they are more likely to
feel that they have some influence over local neighborhood organiza-
tions."20 7 However, the promise of influence in the CIC setting is more
illusion than reality, because of most common interest communities' fun-
damental failure to kindle trust.
Significantly, in the suburban setting links have been found "between
community characteristics and trust in local government."20 8 Residents
with confidence in their local government may have more positive atti-
tudes about their communities, and vice-versa. 20 9 The most pertinent ele-
ments to inspire trust in local government are:
performance, or the degree to which citizens view their local gov-
ernment as able to solve problems that occur in the community.
The second is efficiency, or the extent to which citizens perceive
that their local government uses the resources at its disposal in a
careful, unwasteful manner. The third is attention to citizens, or
the perception among residents that government is responsive to
individuals' needs and acts in ways to avoid political alienation
among its constituency. The fourth is overall feelings of confi-
dence in local government, a general measure of trust derived by
summing the attitudes in the first three areas. 210
To apply these variables specifically to the common interest commu-
nity setting would reveal considerable deficiencies. If homeowners' as-
sociations are indeed the functional equivalent of mini-governments, one
could reasonably conjecture that many associations would not fare very
well in residents' estimation of their performance, efficiency, responsive-
ness to individuals' needs and ability to inspire feelings of overall confi-
206. See Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential Government
Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 345, 346 (1992) (proposing
that common interest communities need bill of rights). The State of Virginia re-
cently adopted a homeowners' bill of rights that imposes upon associations some
of the same mandates (such as open-meeting rules) that would apply to local gov-
ernments. See Benjamin, supra note 26, at 58.
207. Cochrun, supra note 64, at 94 (citations omitted).
208. BALDASSARE, supra note 119, at 108.
209. See id. (stating that overall feeling of confidence in local government is
derived by summing attitudes of its constituents).
210. Id.
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dence. As CICs come to function more and more like larger, inflexible
bureaucracies, poor performance ratings seem inevitable.2 1 '
If low levels of trust in homeowners' associations diminish social capi-
tal, finding ways to enhance residents' confidence should strengthen so-
cial fabric. Associations should be concerned with residents' estimation of
their performance and with building the esteem in which their leadership
is held. Developers and planners should turn their attention to finding
structural forms that promote association accountability and encourage
member participation. As antidotes to residents' feelings of powerlessness
and lack of influence are found, trust should grow.
3. Integration and Fulfillment of Needs
The concept of integration and fulfillment of needs is best under-
stood as the sense that "we're all in this together," and that a system of
reciprocity bolstered by shared values and common expectations will con-
tribute both to the collective's as well as to the individual's best interests.
The idea is reflected in Martin Buber's account of "the need of man to
feel his own house as a room in some greater, all-embracing structure in
which he is at home, to feel that the other inhabitants of it with whom he
lives and works are all acknowledging and confirming his individual exis-
tence. "212 Essential to this elusive state is "a sense of belonging and mu-
tual affirmation."2 13
The very premise and promise of the common interest community
construct is that "in unity there is strength." Part of its attraction is that
residents' joining together "makes possible a more comfortable lifestyle
than the owners could afford individually."2 1 4 To achieve a sense of inte-
gration and fulfillment of needs, however, community leadership must be
able to prioritize its agenda mindful of its residents' personal needs for
diversity, affiliation, belonging and feeling productive. 215
Integration and fulfillment of needs can be thought of in terms
of reinforcements for certain behaviors. For a group to maintain
a sense of togetherness, the individual-group association must of-
fer positive reinforcements to the members. Positive reinforce-
ments might be status of membership, success of the community,
or the competence or capabilities of other members.
2 16
211. See id. at 119 ("As local governments become more bureaucratic and spe-
cialized, residents consider these institutions inflexible and overly complex.
Under these conditions the view of government as wasteful would follow.").
212. MARTIN BUBER, PATHS IN UTOPIA 140 (R.F.C. Hull trans., 1949).
213. TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 32.
214. Razzi, supra note 18, at 87.
215. See SARASON, supra note 61, at 131-60 (recognizing that community is
comprised of myriad of groups, transient and permanent, which may vary in size
and have both similar and different purposes).
216. Cochrun, supra note 64, at 94 (citing McMillan & Chavis, supra note 74,
at 6-23).
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The literature suggests that carrots, rather than sticks, work best to
achieve a sense of cohesiveness and belonging. The bundle of sticks used
by common interest community associations and boards to compel com-
pliance may, therefore, do more harm than good. "Negative reinforce-
ments". do not build community, nor do they contribute to the individual's
sense of the larger whole as an inviting, embracing structure.
4. Shared Emotional Connection
The premise of shared emotional connection as a community-builder
is that the greater the quality and quantity of resident interaction, the bet-
ter.2 17 A central component of community is social exchange. 218 Neigh-
bors who share experiences and get to know each other are more likely to
trust each other and to participate in a system of reciprocity. 2 19 That posi-
tive interactions lead to tighter cohesiveness while negative interactions
fray the fabric of community is no surprise. 220 People who feel emotion-
ally connected to their neighborhood will often avoid conflict and combat-
iveness for the sake of the community's stability.2 21
Elements of space and design play an important role in fostering posi-
tive interactions. 222 The spatial layout of a given development has the po-
tential to become an important contributor to social capital. 22 3 "New
urbanism" is the name of the relatively recent ideological movement
rooted in the premise that the built environment can help to create com-
munity.22 4 This movement is described as " [p] art planning and part polit-
217. See McMillan & Chavis, supra note 74, at 13-14 (defining concept of
shared emotional connection).
218. See Carl Keane, Socioenvironmental Determinants of Community Formation, 23
ENV'T & BEHAV. 27, 27-28 (1991) (noting importance of social exchange).
219. For a discussion of shared experiences of neighbors, see supra notes 109-
24 and accompanying text.
220. See Buckner, supra note 91, at 786-88 (indicating that residents in neigh-
borhoods have level of cohesion).
221. See Donald G. Unger et al., Living Near a Hazardous Waste Facility: Coping
with Individual and Family Distress, 62 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 55, 66 (1992) (dem-
onstrating link between emotional connection and conflict avoidance).
222. See Emily Talen, Sense of Community and Neighborhood Form: An Assessment of
the Social Doctrine of New Urbanism, 36 URB. STUD. 1361, 1362 (1999) (investigating
"the empirical and theoretical basis that is behind the attempt to promote social
interaction and sense of community through the physical design of
communities").
223. See R. Fleming et al., Social Support and the Physical Environment, in SocIAL
SUPPORT AND HEALTH 327, 333-35, 34243 (S. Cohen & S.L. Syme eds., 1985) (stat-
ing that variables of space and design affect quality and quantity of resident inter-
action and can be used to enhance sense of community).
224. See Alex Krieger, Since (and Before) Seaside, in TOWNS AND TOWN-MAKNG
PRINCIPLES 9, 9-16 (Alex Krieger & William Lennertz eds., 1991) (discussing
Duany's and Plater-Zyberk's concept of "new urbanism");Jerry Frug, The Geography
of Community, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1047, 1089-94 (1996) (explaining how "new urban-
ism" creates community); KATZ, supra note 57, at ix-x (explaining "new urban-
ism"); Nasar &Julian, supra note 85, at 178 (discussing "new urbanism").
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ical theory, part social structuralist and part environmentalist. '225 It relies
on use of the physical environment to help redress "many of the ills of our
current sprawl development pattern while returning to a cherished Ameri-
can icon: the compact, close-knit community." 226
For example, to encourage meaningful resident interaction, new ur-
banism advocates resort to smaller lots positioned close to pedestrian-
friendly streets, front porches, additional common areas and multi-use
open spaces. 22 7 Its design recommendations endeavor to promote inclu-
sionary and heterogeneous housing practices by encouraging mixed-use
developments that incorporate not only single-family homes but apart-
ment buildings and townhouses as well. 228 New urbanism, then, repre-
sents an important antidote to the often economically exclusionary effects
of more homogeneous, single-use CICs. Diversity in architecture, in other
words, can promote so-called "building" social capital. 229
One segment of new urbanism embraces "neo-traditional town plan-
ning,"230 an architectural technique that endeavors to strengthen sense of
community by replicating the design patterns of America's small towns as
they existed prior to World War 11.231 Neo-traditional towns have been
described as "tightly clustered villages featuring narrow streets, front
porches, and a seamless mix of residential, commercial, and civic struc-
tures all within easy walking distance of each other."232 Community inter-
225. Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 330 (1998).
226. KATZ, supra note 57, at ix. New urbanism is not without its detractors.
Some social scientists maintain that the quality and frequency of resident interac-
tion is more a matter of homogeneity than spatial design. See, e.g., Karen E. Camp-
bell & Barrett A. Lee, Sources of Personal Neighbor Networks: Social Integration, Need, or
Time?, 70 Soc. FORCES 1077, 1093 (1992) (concluding that major factors that influ-
ence resident interaction are socioeconomic status, gender and age).
227. See Bruce L. Levine, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Comedy of Commu-
nity: The Commons in History, 14J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 81, 82 (1986) (discussing
means for better resident interaction).
228. See Peter Calthorpe, The Region, in KATZ, supra note 57, at xi, xi (applying
principles of urban design to region).
229. For a discussion of common interest communities, see supra notes 129-61
and accompanying text.
230. See Alexander Christoforidis, New Alternatives to the Suburb: Neo-traditional
Developments, 8 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 429, 429 (May 1994) (describing neo-tradi-
tional town planning); Susan Handy, Neo-Traditional Development: The Debate, 6
BERKELEY PLAN. J. 135, 135 (1991) (speaking of debate over neo-traditional
development).
231. See Christoforidis, supra note 230, at 429 (basing its designs on traditional
small town model); Handy, supra note 230, at 135 (describing increased interest in
this type of planning).
232. Cochrun, supra note 64, at 97. (citing Andres Duany & Elizabeth Plater-
Zyberk, The Second Coming of the American Small Town, 16 WILSON Q. 1, 19-51 (Win-
ter 1992)); see also Krieger, supra note 224, at 12 (urging sociable living: "town life
instead of housesitting, street-strolling instead of strip-cruising, front porches in
addition to backyards"); Ruth Eckdish Knack, Repent, Ye Sinners, Repent, 55 PLAN. 4,
5-6 (1989) (describing "neotraditional" town planning); Phillip Langdon, A Good
[Vol. 47: p. 553
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action is facilitated by developing common areas that are pedestrian
accessible. 233
Where launched, new urbanist designs have been lauded as commer-
cially successful 234 and "promising."2 35 In the CIC arena, "[m]any of the
most successful master planned communities of the late 1990's have signif-
icant neo-traditional aspects. '23 6 This finding supports the premise that a
sense of community is important to CIC prosperity and that spatial layout
can help to build social capital.
Still, "master-planned picturesqueness,"23 7 by itself, does not make a
community. While spatial and physical design innovations represent im-
portant steps, more than architecture is required to cultivate community.
Recent accounts of the struggles of life in Disney's model towns 238-the
pinnacles of neo-traditional planning-support the proposition that true
community cannot be prepackaged, and that the artifices of design must
be supplemented by institutional reform and the conscious as well as con-
scientious resolve on the part of leaders and residents to build figurative
bridges of spirit.
Shared emotional connection is built by communication, a factor so
important that some would place it into its own. category as a universal
characteristic of community. 2 39 A sense of community grows when com-
munication between members is direct and many-sided. 240 Significantly,
"relations between members should be direct ... to the extent that they
are unmediated-by representatives, leaders, bureaucrats, institutions
such as those of the state, or by codes, abstractions and reifications."
24 1
The point here is relatively straightforward: "[A] group of individuals
amongst whom relations are to some extent mediated is to that extent less
Place to Live, 261 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 39, 48-49 (1988) (describing "neotraditional"
design principles).
233. See DONALD APPLEYARD, LIVABLE STREETS 244 (1972) (showing streets to
be neighborly territories).
234. See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 29, at 605 (giving examples of
success).
235. See Sarah Boxer, A Remedy for the Rootlessness of Modern Suburban Life?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1998, at B7 (quoting Jane Jacobs, pioneer of concept of social
capital).
236. Hyatt, supra note 225, at 331.
237. See Lawrence W. Cheek, Control Thy Neighbor, SEATTLE WKLY., May 7, 1998,
at 22 ("The problem is that [New Urbanism] is master-planned picturesque-
ness .... It fakes a village.").
238. See FRANTZ & COLLINS, supra note 127, at 95 (noting problems in home
construction including porches installed using incorrect material and painting
problems); Ross, supra note 127, at 96-97 (describing performance anxiety of Cele-
bration's residents who are always being tested and examined for success).
239. See, e.g., KARL DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION 60-80
(1953) (defining communication in terms of nationality).
240. See TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 27-28 (explaining that members' relations
must be unmediated by others).
241. Id.
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of a community than a group in which relations are relatively direct."242
The problem in the common interest community setting, then, is that
there are few incentives for residents to deal directly with each other. In-
stead, the system is set up to require dealings with a centralized medium-
the board of directors or homeowners' association-who in turn enforce a
formal code, in the form of the declaration of covenants, conditions and
restrictions. At work is a rigid and abstract perception of what the commu-
nity should be. This hinders the formation of actual community.
IV. COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY:
AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
Traditional common interest community models, which over-empha-
size covenants, conditions and restrictions as a planning and control de-
vice, give developers too much power for too long. Conventional
paradigms favor regulation and enforcement to the detriment of social
networks and produce rigid, uninspired leadership models. Imposing re-
strictions upon people who are largely strangers to each other, and then
prescribing aggressive measures to enforce those regulations, leads to a
misplaced preoccupation with control and compliance. A sense of com-
munity cannot develop in a climate of mandates and distrust. Regimenta-
tion without consensus or perceived legitimacy is destined to fail.
Excessive restrictiveness contributes to a false sense of what "commu-
nity" as a construct should be, rather than what it could be. Relying on
edicts and restraints to impose commonality of interest does not work, and
is more likely to make enemies of neighbors and disenfranchised com-
plainants of association members. Cultures of litigiousness are bound to
follow.
Such a result is ironic, because implicit in the very concept of the
common interest community is the belief that social capital is impor-
tant.243 Yet, social capital cannot be nurtured, let alone sustained, in set-
tings of unbridled restrictiveness, with their attendant self-absorption in
the rules and methods of rule enforcement. Rather than providing incen-
tives to act collaboratively and in furtherance of the common good, the
CIC prototype is pre-programmed to have the opposite effect. More often
than not, the result is apt to be divisiveness and residents' preoccupation
with self-interest, so that the individual and the collective become adversa-
ies. Transaction costs then escalate as time, money and resources are de-
voted to monitoring others' obedience, imposing sanctions for their
disobedience, and litigating the inevitable stand-offs as given targets fight
back.
242. Id. at 28.
243. See, e.g., Wayne S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the
Development and Administration of Condominium and Homeowners' Associations, 12
WAKE FoREST L. Rrv. 915, 917-18 (1976) (describing CIC associations as "a vehicle
for individual unit owners to work together").
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In a telling view of our litigious ways, the observation has been made
that:
Almost imperceptibly, the treasure that we spend on getting it in
writing has steadily expanded since 1970, as has the amount that
we spend on getting lawyers to anticipate and manage our dis-
putes. In some respects, this development may be one of the
most revealing indicators of the fraying of our social fabric. For
better or worse, we rely increasingly-we are forced to rely in-
creasingly-on formal institutions, and above all on the law, to
accomplish what we used to accomplish through informal net-
works reinforced by generalized reciprocity-that is through so-
cial capital. 244
In the common interest community setting, the consequences of this
reliance on formal institutions to do the work of social capital are found in
this snapshot of life:
In the past, suburbanites used gentle nudges to prod neighbors
to act responsibly-when their grass grew a bit too high, for in-
stance. Now a representative from the community association
comes by to precisely measure grass and, for a fee, will mow lawns
that have grown unruly. The whole process formalizes a social
exchange that has historically been informal.245
Rather than leaving it to a network of relationships and social norms
to kindle cooperation, excessive reliance on formalized rules and proce-
dures creates systems of cynicism and suspicion, with neighbors turning on
neighbors, neighbors turning on associations, and associations turning on
individual targets. Lawyers, courts and legislatures become the arbiters,
managers and referees of this fracas, as formal institutions clumsily at-
tempt to do what an intact social fabric would have helped to avert in the
first place.
Common interest community developers, in coming up with existing
models, did not intend to stifle community or to promote some "anti-com-
munity" mission. Rather, "the early drafters and 'creators' were searching
for answers with very little guidance. They had no utopian or anti-utopian
agenda."24 6 Guidance is available today. The shortcomings of the present
state of affairs, coupled with what is known about community building,
offer potent incentives and insights for informed reform. Developers are
(and should be) experimenting with new formats, 247 if not altruistically,
then opportunistically. Strife does not sell.
244. PUTNAM, supra note 32, at 147.
245. Robert E. Lang & Karen A. Danielson, Gated Communities in America: Wall-
ing Out the World?, 8 HoUSING POL'Y DEBATE 867, 873 (1997).
246. Hyatt, supra note 225, at 328.
247. See id. at 321-23 (offering examples of new developer formats).
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A better way exists. Common interest communities, at least in theory,
have the potential to be models for a revitalized, revivified sense of com-
munity. This moment in time presents a significant opportunity. As the
rental market in urban centers continues to shrink, the retirement age
population continues to grow, and more and more people demonstrate
their preferences for residential developments instead of isolated tracts, 248
common interest communities have the capacity to satisfy more than just
the, need for housing. Planners and leaders of common interest commu-
nities should be concerned with building the sorts of networks and con-
tacts among residents that are likely to elicit a sense of continuity and
shared responsibility. With this sense of place and purpose intact, adher-
ence to reasonable practices that are in the collective's best interests would
not have to be compelled. Indeed, "societies which rely heavily on the use
of force are likely to be less efficient, more costly, and more unpleasant
than those where trust is maintained by other means."
249
Building social capital is not easy and takes time. Initial change may
have to be more evolutionary than revolutionary. Planners and leaders
must actively cultivate the determinants of community, and patiently com-
mit to the premise that a strong social fabric is not only desirable but at-
tainable. Once in place, forced compliance with behavior in the best
interests of the community would become the exception rather than the
rule, as routine patterns of exchange would come to serve as the principal
basis upon which to enforce agreements.
Presently, most common interest communities put the cart before the
horse, relying on elaborately prepackaged mandates to impose "commu-
nity," rather than facilitating the development of a genuine social fabric,
which in turn would render many of those edicts simply unnecessary. In
other words, " [w] e need a change in the way we draft documents and ap-
ply them so that the emphasis is not on telling people what they can't do,
but helping them to do things that genuinely create communities." 250
To facilitate this end, practitioners and community leaders need to
build a lexicon that recasts the dialogue in terms that facilitate coopera-
tion, compromise and "self-interest rightly understood."2 51 "Community"
as a concept and a work in progress must be featured prominently in the
words and constructs chosen to depict initiatives and resolve controversies.
Prevalent modes of legal discourse and dispute resolution do not do a very
good job of this, as they struggle to deal with "social environments-the
criss-crossing networks of associations and relationships that constitute the
248. See Rohan, supra note 4, at 5-6 (describing trend of people opting for
residential communities over urban living).
249. Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 213, 221 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).
250. Trognitz, "Yes, It's My Castle", supra note 4, at 31.
251. For a discussion of creating communities, see supra notes 114-18 and
accompanying text.
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fine grain of society."'25 2 Here, the lessons learned and paradigms bor-
rowed from other disciplines, including community psychology, help to
bring into focus the importance and value of intact social infrastructures
and networks.
A leading practitioner, author and former president of the Commu-
nity Associations Institute astutely observed that "[t]here has been too
much focus on restrictions and not enough on people." 253 With this in
mind, existing models must be reconfigured. First, to preclude developers
from exerting strong-arm protracted control over association policies and
procedures, developers should take their cue from the Restatement
(Third) of Property and turn control over to the community association
"[a]fter the time reasonably necessary to protect [their] interests in com-
pleting and marketing the project .... 254
Reform initiatives should move away from corporate governance
models in favor of more participatory structures that redistribute and de-
centralize authority. Governance structures should actively chip away at
patterns of regimentation and reject rules that are not reasonably related
to protecting unit owners' legitimate interests. Applicable restrictions
must be perceived as fair, rational and beneficial. The Restatement
(Third) provides meaningful guidance when it states that, in the absence
of a broader grant of authority contained in the declaration, the associa-
tion's power to regulate conduct inside given units is limited to rules
aimed at curbing "nuisance-like activities" that interfere with other unit
owners' use or enjoyment.2 55 The Restatement's Comments explain that
this provision is consistent with "the traditional expectations of property
owners that they are free to use their property for uses that are not prohib-
ited and do not unreasonably interfere with their neighbors' use and en-
joyment of their property."25 6
Instead of imposing an exhaustive litany of covenants, conditions and
restrictions from the start, the declaration should contain only those few
rules deemed essential to promoting the community's basic structure and
well-being. The declaration should empower associations to carefully and
deliberately supplement its skeletal frame with appropriate regulations on
an as-needed basis. Residents' involvement in the augmentation process
should be actively solicited and encouraged, as should their entitlement to
participate in subsequent modification and amendment procedures.
This "wait and see" approach to the implementation of restrictions
allows time for the development of norms of generalized reciprocity. In
other words, it gives social capital a chance to do its work, relieving formal
institutions and formalized prohibitions of the burdens of having to ac-
252. GLENDON, supra note 56, at 115.
253. Trognitz, "Yes, It's My Castle", supra note 4, at 31 (quoting Wayne S.
Hyatt).
254. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.19(2) (2000).
255. See id. § 6.7 cmt. b (setting limits on association's power).
256. Id.
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complish what is best left to informal networks.2 57 Liberalizing the
amendment process leaves more room for change as the community takes
form. Residents in turn will have to accept their power and become en-
gaged in the life of their developments, willing to accept the duties as well
as the rewards of participation, collaboration and compromise. An
agenda for reform then will test "whether our thirst for great community
life outweighs our hunger for private backyards, discount megamalls, and
easy parking."258
Working creatively with space and design is another way to help to
cultivate the sorts of social norms and systems of generalized reciprocity
that deter neighbors from unreasonably interfering with each others' use
and enjoyment. Moreover, eclectic housing styles and mixed uses are out-
ward looking and fortify stocks of bridging (meaning inclusive) social capi-
tal. Diversity is an important aim. To this end, some new common
interest communities are embracing "diversity in uses, population,
demographics, architectural character, and architectural style" 259 to
render developments more affordable and more heterogeneous.
In this regard, the new resolve of the Community Associations Insti-
tute is promising. This national amalgam of homeowners' associations has
directed its attention to "enhancing harmony within associations. '260 Its
spokesperson reports that rather than "nit-picking" and focusing on how
to rigidly enforce rules, the group is now investing more of its energy in
finding ways to build community. 261 It has adopted its own "best practices
initiative" to promulgate "national benchmarks for community association
performance and a showcase for community excellence." 2 62 It promises
that "[t] he information compiled will help volunteer leaders manage their
community's operations more effectively and will assist both communities
and residents across the country."2 63
V. CONCLUSION
The challenge for all of us as academics, practitioners, empiricists,
CIC developers, planners, leaders and residents is not to lament the with-
ering state of community, but to help guide its restoration. 264 Common
257. See generally PUTNAM, supra note 32, at 288 ("Social capital greases the
wheels that allow communities to advance smoothly.").
258. Id. at 408.
259. Hyatt, supra note 196, at 448.
260. Vanderpool, supra note 131, at 2.
261. See id. (prioritizing need to build community).
262. Community Associations Institute Research Foundation, Research Projects:
Best Practices, at http://www.cairf.org/research/index.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2001).
263. Id.
264. See PUTNAM, supra note 32, at 403-14 (summarizing "an agenda for social
capitalists" in order "to create new structures and policies (public and private) to
facilitate renewed civic engagement").
[Vol. 47: p. 553
40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss3/2
DOES IT TAKE A VILLAGE?
interest communities have an important part to play in the difficult task of
recreating social capital. Unfortunately, traditional models, with their reli-
ance on restrictiveness and control, do more to weaken social connected-
ness than to build it.
Acknowledging the problem and continuing to gauge its dimensions
is an important first step toward meaningfully reikoning with existing defi-
ciencies and their implications. Still, the more formidable challenge per-
sists. To actually "replenish our stocks of social capital" 265 in the CIC
setting will require new, more creative structures and policies rooted in a
collective resolve to renew community by reconfiguring existing systems of
interpersonal interaction and reassessing present patterns of
regimentation.
In this, as in all settings, what we think about most is what we move
towards. Reinvention of the common interest community requires a com-
prehensive, nationwide rethinking of association goals and missions.
Community associations must be redefined so that their central agenda is
cast in terms of the very conscious resolve to rebuild withering social
bonds. Careful, deliberate and sustained attention must be given to the
arduous task of finding ways to guide community engagement so that in
time a strong social fabric will become the principal determinant of com-
patible, harmonious land use and behavior that is respectful of the rights
of others.
Change requires recognition that there is a problem and firm com-
mitment to the premise that it is fixable. Intention is the essential catalyst
for meaningful action. Although the fodder for countless jokes, the point
remains that "we have to want to change." Change-averse developers and
leaders must be willing to modify existing formats and surrender old mod-
els of control by proclamation. Declarations must be pared down and
recrafted to allow representative and responsive associations to provide
formal augmentation only when needed.
Worthwhile change may, particularly at first, seem more akin to evolu-
tionary progression rather than revolutionary reinvention. With time,
commitment and effort, however, true communities do emerge. Once in
place, they offer the promise and hope of restored trust and connection.
Communities are able to promote social norms that are appropriate, per-
suasive, intrinsically relevant and therefore sustainable without first resort-
ing to rigid mandates or aggressive enforcement mechanisms.
Communities find substantive ways to build bridges and reach shared
understandings.
265. Id. at 403.
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